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WESTERN IDEOLOGY, JAPANESE PRODUCT 
SAFETY REGULATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
DAVID COHENt 
KAREN MARTIN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I n  the forty years since the end of the Second World War, Japan 
has emerged from its post-war position of near economic devastation 
to become one of Canada's, and indeed one of North America's, 
leading trade partners.' AIthough Canada was the world's seventh 
largest exporter to Japan in 1981 (fourth if oil exporting countries 
are excluded): the high political profile of United States-Japan 
trade relations has tended to shadow the importance of Canada- 
Japan trade. Since 1973 Japan has been Canada's second largest 
export market, trailing only the United  state^.^ The traditional com- 
position of the exports and imports of both Japan and Canada is 
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1 In  1981, Japan had exports to North America totalling $42.3 billion (U.S.) 
and imports from North America totalling almost $30 billion (U.S.) : 30: I, 
1981 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS (1g82), a t  537. 
Id., a t  197, 
Supra, note I. 
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reflected in the trade figures: an overwhelming percentage of Can- 
ada's exports to Japan falls within the category of raw materials, 
and a corresponding percentage of Japan's exports to Canada are 
manufactured goods.4 
Canada has maintained a consistent trade surplus with Japan 
since 1973, in contrast to its trade balances with the United States 
and the European Economic C~mmunity.~ This may explain Can- 
ada's relative reticence in the wake of international (largely Ameri- 
can) criticism of Japanese trade policies.' The United States' deficit 
with Japan has resulted in considerable trade friction between the 
two countries, and has led to charges by American businessmen and 
government officials that the Japanese market is unfairly and un- 
necessarily closed to foreign i~nporters.~ In April of 1983, a former 
Japanese ambassador to the United States commented that he had 
"never seen the mood on Capitol Hill as ugly as it is now toward 
the Japanese".' 
Hostility toward Japanese trade policy is not, however, confined 
to the United States. Recently, both France and Canada instituted 
systematic customs slowdowns as protectionist measures directed re- 
spectively against Japanese videotape recorders and autom~biles.~ 
In  1981 fully manufactured goods constituted 4% of Canadian exports to 
Japan, while they represented 95.5% of Japanese exports to Canada: Sta- 
tistics Canada. For a comprehensive analysis, see CANADA'S EXPORT DEVEL- 
OPMENT PLAN FOR JAPAN (Department of External M a i n  Publication) 
(1g82), at  218-19. See also Government of Canada, Industry, Trade, and 
Commerce Publication, MARKETS FOR CANADIAN EXPORTERS : JAPAN ( I 979), 
at  21. 
In  recent years, Canada has experienced moderate success in increasing its 
exports of semi-processed and fully manufactured goods to Japan: Canadian 
Goods Find Japanese Market, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 7 May 1984, at  IB8. 
5 Supra, note I. 
6 But see infra, note g and accompanying text for an example of measures 
taken by the Canadian government to protest Japanese trade policy. 
7 See Subcommittee on Trade, 95th Cong., nd Sess., TASK FORCE REPORT ON 
UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE (1979); and 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT (1979) and TASK FORCE REPORT 
(1g80)l; American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, United States-Japan 
Trade White Paper (1979) 26 JAPAN Q. 491; S. Ohara, Each Side Should 
Make Cool Assessment of its Position Before Blaming the Other, THE JAPAN 
ECONOMIC JOURNAL, I May I 984, at  24. 
8 Nobuhiko Ushiba is quoted in L. Morrow, All the Hazards and Threats of 
Success, TIME, I Aug. 1983, at  22. 
9 Id.; Tighter Customs Inspections Slow Flow of Japanese Cars, THE GLOBE 
AND MAIL, 2 June 1982, at  B6, col. I ;  Flow of Japanese Cars at Idling 
Speed, THE FINANCIAL POST, 5 June 1982, at  4, col. 4. See also EC makes 
Harsh Demands on Japan to Boost Imports, THE JAPAN ECONO~IIC JOURNAL, 
20 Oct. 1981, at  I .  
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While Canada's role in influencing the Japanese to open their mar- 
ket to foreign manufactured goods has been less visible, the Cana- 
dian government, Canadian private enterprise, and private trade 
organizations have been quietly negotiating with their Japanese 
counterparts. The result has been significant positive developments 
in Canada-Japan trade relations in the recent past.1° 
Although it is too early to measure the effects, the Japanese have 
been responsive to Western complaints about non-tariff barriers, as 
evidenced by recent unilateral trade liberalization measures. More- 
over, several statements in defence of Japanese trade policies ought 
to be made. First, the notion of a closed Japanese market may be 
outdated in light of the recent reduction of trade barriers. Second, 
many of the difficulties encountered by foreign firms attempting to 
penetrate the Japanese market are attributable to a misunderstand- 
ing of Japanese culture and a failure to undertake adequate market 
research or product modification.ll Finally, certain non-tariff bar- 
riers, especially those relating to product safety regulation, are based 
on an existing balance of legal and social institutions in Japan which 
is designed to respond to risks to health and safety associated with 
consumer product use. Modification of the trade barriers, without 
substantial reform of Japanese domestic products liability laws and 
the establishment of a sophisticated products liability litigation sys- 
tem, ~vould be unrealistic. Equally unrealistic would be Western 
demands for the adoption of Western legal culture. Trade policies 
cannot be nicely divorced from the Japanese domestic legal environ- 
ment, nor from the society and culture which that environment 
reflects. 
10 For example, in 1981 the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) was the 
first organization of its kind to enter an agreement authorizing it to test and 
certify, outside of Japan, a limited range of electrical products destined for 
the Japanese market. See Canadian Standards Association, ANNUAL REPORT 
(1g81), a t  20. 
While American business was involved in protracted negotiations with the 
Japanese in an attempt to force abandonment of the "buy Japanesey' pro- 
curement policy by Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Public Corporation 
(NTT), a group of Canadian firms was successful in breaking into the tele- 
communications supply network of NTT. See Canadian Firms Penetrating 
Japanese Telecommunications, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 22 April 1983, at  
B I ~ ,  col. I. 
At the same time, protectionist attitudes have not disappeared, and in fact 
may be developing increased support: Trade Group Urges Lower Import 
Limits, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, I Oct. 1983, at  IB3, col. I. 
11 For a defence of the Japanese position, see R. Sinha, Western Outcry 
Against Japanese Import Restriction Does Not Have Much Justification, 
THE JAPAN ECONOBIIC JOURNAL, I June 1982, a t  20; A. Soejima, American 
Complaints are Often Bmed on Outdated Image, THE JAPAN ECONOMIC 
JOURNAL, 19 Jan. 1982, a t  no. 
Heinonline - -  19 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 317 1985 
318 U.B.C. LAW REVIEW VOL. 19:2 
For the purposes of this paper, the barriers to an open Japanese 
market will be divided into two categories: Direct Official Barriers, 
and Non-TarifF Barriers (NTBs).12 The fist category consists of 
positive restraints on imports such as tariffs and quotas. In response 
to Western criticism the Japanese government has, since the early 
1g6os, undertaken measures to dismantle gradually the aggressive 
protectionist wall which may have been necessary to revive the Jap- 
anese economy after the Second World War?3 In fact, in terms of 
quotas and tariffs, many observers presently consider Japan to be 
less "protectionistyy than many North American and European coun- 
tries.14 Despite these trade liberalization measures Western com- 
plaints have not ceased, largely because of the continued presence of 
barriers contained in the second category, namely, those of a non- 
tariff nature. 
Non-tarifF trade barriers, l i e  the more obvious tariff and quota 
restrictions, are barriers "that have the effect of restricting or 
modifying the volume, composition, and direction of international 
trade".15 NTBs have customarily been segregated into two categor- 
ies, those which are the reflection of governmental regulatory meas- 
ures: and those which result from private practices. Examples of 
governmental regulatory measures include government procurement 
1 2  For a detailed analysis of these two categories see K. Abbott and C. Tot- 
man, "Black Ships" and Balance Sheets: The Japanese Market and U.S. 
Japan Relations (1981) 3 Nw. J. INT'L AW B BUS. 103, at  116 et seq. 
l3 The war was responsible for 2.8 million deaths and the destruction of 40% 
of the nation's capital stock: ASIA'S NEW GIANT: HOW THE JAPANESE 
ECONOMY WORKS (H. Patrick, H. Rosovsky eds. 1976), a t  g. With the 
dissolution of the Empire, over six million people returned home to an econ- 
omy whose industrial production stood at  20% of the 1934-36 average. See 
R. Sinha, JAPAN'S OPTIONS FOR THE 1980s (1982)~ at  1-2. 
14 During the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Japanese 
tariff reductions of almost 60% were agreed upon, and apparently are being 
complied with conscientiously. For example, since early 1982 Japanese t a r i f f s  
have been cut on over 323 items, and quotas have been eliminated on over 
134 items. The average Japanese tariff on mining and manufacturing prod- 
ucts is 3% compared with the 4% American average and the 5% EEC 
average. By the end of the implementation of the GATT Tokyo Round 
reductions in 1987, Japan's average tariff levels will be lower than U.S. 
tariff levels on comparable industrial products. REPORT OF THE JAPAN- 
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS GROUP (prepared for the President of 
the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan) (1981)~ at  57. 
1 5  C. Prestieau and J. Henry, NON-TARIFF TRADE BARRIERS AS A PROBLEM IN
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1972), a t  55. A Japanese description of the 
Japanese import system in 1978 reveals an extraordinarily complex array of 
rules, guidelines and administration procedures. See Jetro, JAPAN'S IMPORT 
SYSTEM ( 1978)~ at  4-9. 
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poZicieS,le customs practices,1' ccadmiitrative guidance",18 and 
product standards and certification requirements. While quantitative 
measurement of the impact of non-tariff barriers is notoriously difi- 
cult, it has been estimated that over one-half of the non-tariff barriers 
in Japan are related to health and safety standards and regulati~ns.'~ 
The non-tariff barriers presented by private practices are tradi- 
tionally distinguished from direct official barriers and governmental 
regulatory measures in that they represent trade obstacles inherent 
in the Japanese language and culture. After the opening of Japan 
to the West, foreigners quickly discovered that the Japanese have 
their o m  ways of doing things. Japanese language and culture pre- 
sent barriers not only to foreign businessmen, but to any foreigner 
who attempts to deal with the Japanese. St. Francis Xavier, a Jesuit 
missionary who travelled to Japan in the early sixteenth century, 
eventually concluded that the Japanese language had been formed 
by the Devil itself in order to frustrate God's Providence?" In  addi- 
tion to the obvious language barrier, foreigners are faced with the 
complex problems of understanding the Japanese decision-making 
process? the hierarchy of human relationships? and complex prod- 
16 In  the past, Japanese quasi-governmental agencies such as NTT and the 
Japan National Railway, allegedly acting contrary to the MTN Government 
Procurement Code, were unwilling to open their supply system to foreign 
manufacturers. For the American experience in attempting to break into this 
market, see TASK FORCE REPORT (1980), supra, note 7, a t  25-19. See also 
supra, note 14, at 63; J. Jackson, J. Louis, and M. Matsushita, Implementing 
the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing Economic Rules (1982) 81 
MICH. L. REV. 267, a t  327. 
17 Supra, note 14, a t  61. 
1s Administrative guidance (gyosei shido) refers to administrative actions de- 
signed to influence private conduct. Since the legal authority granted to Jap- 
anese governmental agencies is usually framed in broad terms, the agencies 
often have the discretion to determine the procedures by which the legal 
objectives will be obtained. This enables the agency to make recommenda- 
tions or even demands which, if not followed, may result in delays and other 
costs for the private citizen. See Y. Narita, Administrative Guidance (1968) 
2 LAW IN JAPAN 45; R. Lury, Japanese Administrative Practice: The Dis- 
cretionary Role of the Japanese Government Official (1976) 31 Bus. LAW 
210. See also Foreign Firms are Irked Over Needless Procedures, THE JAPAN 
ECONOMIC JOURNAL, I Dec. 1982, a t  I ;  supra, note 14, a t  61-62. 
19 Sinha, supra, note 13, a t  73. 
20 For a sampling of problems foreigners have with the Japanese language, see 
F. Gibney, JAPAN: TEE FRAGILE SUPERPOWER (1975)~ at  144-62; B. De- 
Mente, THE JAPANESE WAY OF DOING BUSINESS (1g81), a t  101-15. 
21 See C. Nakane, JAPANESE S O C I E ~  (1970)~ at  141-48. 
22 Id., at 23-86; K. Yamamura, Behind the "Made in Japan" Label, in POLI- 
T I C ~  AND E C O N O ~ ~ C S  IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN (M. Hyiie, J. Hirschmeier 
eds. 19791, a t  134-35. 
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uct distribution systems,23 to name but a few of the more obscure 
non-tariff barriers. 
This paper proposes to deal with domestic consumer protection 
laws and standards regulation, which have their roots in both cate- 
gories. While most trade analysts differentiate between cultural and 
standards barriers,24 we hope to demonstrate that culture and social 
custom are not nicely distinguishable from law. Design standards, 
testing and certification requirements, positive substance lists and 
other recognized non-tar8 barriers are as much a reflection of 
culture2' as are buyer-supplier customary norms and consumer pref- 
erences for goods produced in Japan.26 Although many product 
standards are explicitly set by government, either directly or through 
subsidiary administrative agencies, this paper wiU illustrate that it 
will be a far more intractable process to adapt these standards to 
meet the demands of Japan's Western trading partners than it was 
to modify existing tariff and quota structures. These non-tariff bar- 
riers are deeply rooted in the Japanese culture and psyche, are not 
obviously motivated by protectionist objects, are often unarticulated 
and non-specific in their effect, and are not subject to reform 
through traditional international trade liberalization agreements. 
In this paper the substantive and procedural aspects of products 
liability law and the standards systems in place in Japan will be 
outlined in order to show how they differ from the analogous prod- 
ucts liability regime and standards systems in Canada. Although 
foreign manufacturers frequently avoid insurance, product design, 
23 For example, the Japanese distribution system is characterized by a large 
number of small retailers and wholesalers, resulting in limited inventory 
space and frequent deliveries. This may result in a competitive advantage 
to' domestic manufacturers. M. Yoshino, THE JAPANESE MARKETING SYS- 
TEM : ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION ( I 97 I ) . 
As well, the relationship of Japanese distributors to their suppliers is such 
that they will not generally carry competitive products, making it extremely 
difficult for foreign suppliers to penetrate established distribution networks. 
See generally Trade Barriers Come In  Creative Packages, INDUSTRY WEEK, 
Vol. 213, No. I, a t  27; United States-Japan Trade White Paper, supra, note 
7; I. Hideto, Anticompetitive Practices in the Distribution of Goods and 
Services in Japan: The  Problem of Distribution Keiretsu ( 1983) J. OF JAP- 
ANESE STUD. 319; Sinha, supra, note 13, a t  87-89. 
The complex distribution system in Japan compares unfavourably with the 
systems of Britain, West Germany and the United States when assessed in 
terms of the number of times goods are exchanged before reaching the ulti- 
mate consumer. Japan: A Survey, THE ECONOMIST, g July 1983, at  13. 
24 TASK FORCE REPORT (1g80), supra, note 7, a t  30, 35. 
25 Id., a t  30, 31, 63. 
This was a comment which frequently turned up in the responses to the 
authors' questionnaire. See infra, note 27. This may manifest itself in a well- 
articulated preference for Japanese products. 
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and litigation costs related to products liabiity risks, Canadian 
manufacturers exporting to Japan must comply with a wide range 
of standards and certification regulations. We conclude that product 
safety regulation in Japan, manifested both in product standards and 
in products liability law, is a reflection of Japanese history, culture, 
religion, and structural and institutional constraints on litigation, 
and that it is unrealistic, if not arrogant, for the West to dismiss 
summarily these standards as being merely protectionist barriers, or 
to demand their modification in accordance with our regulatory 
philosophies. 
In  an attempt to obtain data describing the experience of Cana- 
dian manufacturers exporting to Japan, a survey was carried out of 
139 firms chosen from a number of Japan-Canada export associa- 
tion membership directories. Of the 139 firms selected, 8 responded 
by indicating that they had no experience with the Japanese market, 
and 14 firms could not be located. Of the remaining I 17 firms, 35 
completed an extensive questionnaire relating to products liability 
risks, insurance, Japanese standards barriers, the Japanese regula- 
tory process, and cultural and linguistic barriers. The nature of the 
responses and the limited population prevent us from evaluating 
the data on a statistical or quantitative basis.27 Nevertheless, the 
responses do reveal several characteristics of the Japanese market 
which permit a preliminary evaluation of the impact of Japanese 
product safety regulation on Canadian manufacturers. 
11. PRODUCT SAFETY REGULATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
The development of product safety regulation as a distinct body 
of law can be attributed to the recent increased intrusion of govern- 
mental and judicial bodies into private market relationships with the 
objective of rectifying perceived market dysfunctions. A concern on 
the part of governments with the vulnerability of the average con- 
27 The sample of Canadian firms consisted largely of companies that have a t  
one time exported to Japan, for the purely practical reason that a list of 
names of such firms could be compiled. The efforts of companies which have 
considered exporting to Japan but decided against i t  precisely because of 
standards trade barriers are generally unrecorded. By canvassing the experi- 
ences of firms which were successful in breaking into the Japanese market, 
there is a significant danger of underestimating the trade effects of consumer 
protection law. The most drastic effect of trade barriers will have been ex- 
perienced by those manufacturers who were barred from exporting to Japan, 
and who for the most part are excluded from the survey. 
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sumer confronted with an increasingly complex marketplaceZ8 has 
prompted extensive market regulation. The courts have responded 
through judicial compensation awards in products liability suits, as 
well as judicial regulation of the consumer contract transacting pro- 
cess and the substantive terms of consumer contracts. 
These judicial and governmental actions which function ostensibly 
to provide compensation to injured consumers, to deter deceptive 
trade practices, to provide insurance against product safety risks, 
and to facilitate the development of efficient markets in consumer 
goods, may also have intentional or inadvertent distorting effects on 
international trade. Product movement across national boundaries 
may be affected by any or some of the following regulatory and 
judicial measures : 
( 1) overt or covert discriminatory  standard^;^^ 
( 2) inconsistent and diverse standards among countries;30 
( 3) standards which are not the most cost effective to achieve 
legitimate national objectives; 
( 4) certification and approval procedures;3l 
( 5) import inspection procedures and administrative practices;32 
( 6) country of origin marketing;33 
( 7) advertising regulation;= 
( 8) packaging and labelling reg~la t ion;~~ 
28 Economic Council of Canada, REFORMING REGULATION ( I981 ), at 3. 
29 The most common are standards which are apparently non-discriminatory 
but which are met more easily by domestic industries. P. Sweeney, Technical 
Analysis Of The  Technical Barriers T o  Trade Agreement (1980) 12 LAW 
AND POLICY IN INT. BUS. I 79, at  183. 
30 Inconsistent standards increase information, design and manufacturing costs, 
and may close the market to non-conforming products. See J. Groetzinger, 
The New G A T T  Code and the International Harmonization of Product 
Standards ( I  975) 8 CORNELL INT'L .J. I 68. 
31 P. Oliver, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE E.E.C. (1982)~ at  89. 
32 Id., at 92. 
33 Id., a t  106-09. See Re Restrictions on Importation of Souvenirs: E.C. Com- 
mission v.  Ireland (1982) 33 COM. MKT. L. REP. 706. 
34 See E.C. Directive 70/50, Art. 2 (3) (m) . In  Re Advertising of Alcoholic 
Beverages: E.C. Commission u. France (1981) 31 Conr. MKT. L. REP. 743, 
at  758, the European Court of Justice held that an advertising regulation was 
equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports as it had the effect of 
restricting the volume of imports as a result of its impact on marketing 
prospects. 
35 See E.C. Directive 70/50, Art. 2(3) (j), and Frietje (1981) 32 Coar. MKT. 
LAW REP. 722. Canada has been accused of using language labelling require- 
ments as a non-tariff barrier. Import Issues Torture Ottawa, FINANCIAL 
POST, 14 May 1983, I, col. I. 
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( 9) the use of design rather than performance standards; 
(10) uncertainty and information search costs regarding domestic 
(11) voluntary standards which are used collusively by national 
manufacturers to create effective barriers to entry;37 
(12) products liability risks; 
(13) overt or covert judicial discrimination; 
(14) overt or covert bureaucratic discrimination; and 
(15) government disclosure and freedom of information policy. 
It would be a difficult task to place an empirical value on the 
impact these factors have on trade. I t  is clear, however, that they 
represent substantial increases in costs for exporters. These costs may 
take the form of increased production and marketing expenses, de- 
lays which may result in loss of development potential and market 
share, delayed entry into new markets, adverse effects on reputation 
for quality and reliability, and expenses represented by commitments 
of capita1 and management resources that could have been used 
more productively in alternative investment opportunities. More- 
over, potential exporters who are unable to make the necessary 
adjustments or alterations for economic or technological reasons 
may be forced out of or denied access to the foreign market. 
Product safety regulation has tsvo components which may affect 
international trade. The standard and certification barriers which 
I have described represent the more obvious category. In addition, 
manufacturers exporting to foreign countries will face the risk of 
damage awards if their products are associated with personal injury, 
property damage and economic losses in the foreign jurisdiction. 
The effects on international trade of domestic products liability law 
(that is, the legal rules and principles governing the liability of com- 
mercial suppliers for personal injuries, property damage and eco- 
86 Uncertainty associated with the applicability of foreign consumer protection 
law, the likelihood and nature of legislative or regulatory reform, and local 
and provincial or state law impose considerable risks on foreign manufac- 
turers. GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Part 3 of the Non-Tariff 
Measures, Standards Involving Imports and Domestic Goods, 14 Feb. 1974 
at  3, 4 and No. 272. In addition, domestic manufacturers have the ability 
to iduence the standard setter as an attribute of being located in the same 
jurisdiction: W. Cline et al., TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE TOKYO ROUND 
(1978)~ at 201. See J. Shaul and M. Trebilcock, The Administration of the 
Federal Hazardous Products Act (1982) 7 CAN. BUS. L.J. n, at 31. 
37 See text accompanying notes 157-62. This does not change the fact that 
products stamped with Japanese certification marks are preferred by con- 
sumers. See Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, MARKETS FOR 
CANADIAN EXPORTERS: JAPAN ( I  979), a t  27. 
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nornic losses associated with defective products) are varied and 
subtle. To foreign manufacturers of consumer goods, products liabil- 
ity risks represent current economic costs or future economic risks. 
While products liability law perhaps aims ultimately at a market- 
place with safer products, its deterrent effect is clearly voluntary. 
Manufacturers are not obliged to produce non-defective products 
but may choose to respond to products liability risks by adopting 
any, or a mixture of, conceivable cost or risk reduction measures. A 
product may be withdrawn from (or never introduced into) the 
market; changes in design, production techniques, or quality control 
procedures may be implemented to reduce the frequency of product 
defects; products liability insurance may be taken out; or no positive 
steps may be taken, thus making products liability risk a business 
cost to be absorbed by the firm. Whichever measures are adopted, 
products liability risks undeniably represent costs to manufacturers. 
An evaluation of whether Japanese products liability law operates 
to impede or facilitate exports to Japan requires a comparison of 
products liability risks in the Japanese marketplace and in the juris- 
diction of the foreign manufacturer. Exports to a particular country 
will be inhibited if that country's domestic products liability rules 
are "stricter" than those in the manufacturer's country. Should this 
be the case, the foreign manufacturer will be confronted with a 
higher probability of claims being pursued, an increased magnitude 
of potential claims, or both. If the importing economy represents a 
significant proportion of a firm's market, the costs associated with 
products liability risks may adversely affect its export capabilities. 
In the next section, we offer a brief description of Japanese prod- 
ucts liability law and then evaluate the relative "strictness" of Cana- 
dian and Japanese products liability laws. This will permit certain 
conclusions to be drawn as to their possible impact, a l l  other things 
being equal, on bilateral trade. 
111. JAPANESE PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW38 
The Japanese law of products liability, as yet not consolidated,39 
can be found largely in the Civil Code:' as well as in various Acts 
38 Major sources in English on this topic include: Z. Kitagawa, DOING Busr- 
NESS IN JAPAN, Vol. 7, Part XI11 [hereinafter cited as Kitagawa] ; Y. Fujita, 
Product Liability Law (1980) I JAPAN L.J. 160 [hereinafter cited as Fujita]; 
Adachi et al., PRODUCT LIABILITY: A MANUAL OF PRACTICE IN SELECTED 
NATIONS, JAPAN ( I 981 ) . 
39 A draft model law on products liability was proposed in 1975 by a group of 
scholars, but has not been accepted by the Ministry of Justice. Since Japan 
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directed at specific areas of activity4' and in local ordinances?' The 
Civil Code dates from the late nineteenth century;'3 and its drafters 
did not contemplate the development of a discrete, sophisticated and 
coherent body of consumer protection law. As is typical of most civil 
law systems, the Code provisions are flexible and drafted in such 
general that the judiciary are not formally restrained from 
applying it to new social, economic and technological phenomena. 
As a body of law describing the legal obligations of suppliers and 
users of products which are associated with risks to health and safety, 
products liability law in Japan could be accurately described as 
fairly underdeveloped relative to Western concepts of civil legal re- 
sponsibilityP5 Several factors may be offered to explain this phenom- 
enon. The first is the non-litigious behaviour of the JapaneseP6 In a 
is a civil law jurisdiction in which general codes purport to establish a com- 
plete law for the judiciary to apply to particular facts, there is a reluctance 
to create specific legislation which might excessively bind judges when the 
Civil Code is conceptually broad enough to recognize this area of law. The 
English translation of the proposed Act can be found in Kitagawa, supra, 
note 38, at  4-40. 
40 The Civil Code, Law No. 89, 1896, as amended. See also Kitagawa, supra, 
note 38, a t  4-7; and Y. Noda, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW (A. Angelo 
trans. 1976)~ a t  197. 
41 For example, the Drug Side Effects Injuries Relief Fund Act, Law No. 55, 
1979 and the Consumer Products Safety Act, Law No. 31, 1973, which 
regulate the quality of various designated products such as soft drink bottles 
by requiring safety inspections and official approval prior to marketing. 
4' See Prefectural Ordinance on Consumer Protection of Osaka Prefecture 
(1973) JAPAN QUARTERLY 255. Local ordinances adopt a comprehensive 
approach to products liability rather than a product by product approach. 
They set out obligations which should be fulfilled by business, but because 
of the Prefecture's limited authority to legislate, the ordinances represent 
only recommendations and public announcements. Kitagawa, however, warns 
us not to underestimate their effectiveness in Japan, and calls them one of 
the most important developments in Japanese products liability law. Kita- 
gawa, supra, note 38, a t  4-35. 
43 H. Tanaka, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM (1976), a t  60. 
44 For example, Article I of the Civil Code declares, "All private rights shall 
conform to the public welfare", and "duties shall be carried out in accor- 
dance with the principles of good faith and trust". 
45 "Underdeveloped" in this context can be defined in two ways. In  one sense 
it can be taken to refer to a situation where the law contemplates a remedy 
in theory, but which for all practical purposes is beyond the reach of the 
potential p la ints  because of severe procedural and evidentiary problems. In  
another sense, i t  can refer to legal concepts which were originally applicable 
to a large range of conflict situations, and which have been artificially modi- 
fied to deal with a social and economic phenomenon which did not exist 
when the concepts were first articulated. 
46 The number of civil suits per capita is reported to be 4 to 10% that of many 
Western countries. See supra, note 43, a t  255-60; Material on Canada-Japan 
Legal and Business Relations (Continuing Legal Education Society of British 
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society that has developed a sophisticated extra-curial system of 
dispute resolution,4' the litigation alternative is often regarded as a 
last resort. The Japanese attitudes to litigation may be traceable in 
part to the Japanese preference for "harmonious reconciliation" over 
adversarial settlement of social problems. Japanese people have been 
described as accepting life's problems as the consequences of nature 
following its own coursep8 and participation in a lawsuit is some- 
times considered shameful4g and a serious breakdown of social order. 
I t  should also be noted that the concept of legal "rights" is a 
foreign ones0 that was not introduced into Japan until the late nine- 
teenth century. The Japanese language did not even contain a word 
to express the concept until kenri was coined during the period of 
Western code adaptation.'l Products liability suits in tort were vir- 
tually unheard of before 1 9 6 0 . ~ ~  
The judiciary has been slow to respond to the problem of con- 
sumer protection in products liability suits. Many of the principles 
and conceptual approaches to Japanese products liability law have 
been developed during major multiple injury casess3 (often asso- 
Columbia Seminar) ( I g80), at  30; D. Henderson and J. Anderson, Japanese 
Law: A Profile, in AN INTRODUC~ON TO JAPA ESE CMLIZATION (A. Tiede- 
man ed. 1974)~ a t  570-91, reproduced in Morishima, INTRODUC~ON TO JAP- 
ANESE LAW (1g80), at  15-16. 
Some academics attribute this non-litigious behaviour to the Japanese 
aversion to conflict while others explain it as a manifestation of structural 
impediments to litigation, and the availability of alternative informal mech- 
anisms for promoting dispute resolution. For the former view, see T. Kawa- 
shima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan ( 1963) LAW IN JAPAN 41 ; 
and for the latter, see J. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant (1978) 
4 J. OF JAPANESE STUD. 359. 
47 For example several Civil Code provisions and special legislative schemes 
regulate compromise both before and during litigation and conciliation 
among the conflicting interests represented in the lawsuit. These procedures 
are usually executed before a summary court and may be given the effect of 
formal judgment. For a detailed discussion of the various techniques, see 
Kitagawa, supra, note 38, at  Part XIV. 
* C. Kim and C. Lawson, The Law of the Subtle Mind: The Traditional 
Japanese Conception of Law (1979) 28 INT'L k COMP. LAW Q. 491, at  
501-02. See also F. K. Upham, Litigation and Moral Consciousness in Japan: 
An Interpretative Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution Suits (1976) 10 LAW 
S o c ~ ~ n  REV. 579, at  591. 
49 Kim and Lawson, id., at 503. 
50 Id.  
J1 Henderson and Anderson, supra, note 46, at 570-91. 
" Kitagawa, supra, note 38, a t  4-2. See also, S. Niibori and R. Cosway, 
Products Liability in Sales Transactions (1967) 42 WASH. L. REV. 483. 
53 These cases include the thalidomide litigation of 1965, the Morigana pow- 
dered milk litigation of 1973, the "Big Four" pollution cases of the early 
Ig7OS, and more recently the SMON cases involving a drug which caused a 
neurological disease in I 2,000 people. See Upham, supra, note 48. 
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ciated with adulterated food products and adverse pharmaceutical 
reactions), and relatively little attention has been paid to the plight 
of the isolated plaintiff and his difiiculties in proving his case. Since 
major products liability cases are exceedingly rare, the Japanese 
court has simply not had the opportunity to consider the problem 
over a wide variety of s i tuat i~ns.~~ 
Finally, several, commentators have argued that the limited resort 
to litigation in Japan is not simply a reflection of social myths which 
characterize the Japanese as 'litigation averse' and possessing a low 
level of legal consciousness. Rather, the attenuated products liability 
laws may reflect the considerable structural obstacles to litigation, 
including the undersupply of judges and lawyers, procedural delays, 
inefficient appeal rules, and substantive evidentiary rules which op- 
erate against the interests of plaintiffs.55 Yet even accepting that 
point, it is difficult to ignore the obvious argument that had litigation 
been preferred, one would have expected the public institutional 
framework and private activities to have developed to meet that 
demand. Litigation has not been demanded by the Japanese, and 
that in and of itself reveals something about attitudes and values. 
In any event, and whatever the reasons, products liability law, ex- 
cept in cases of "mass torts" in which community interests can be 
seen to justify otherwise purely individualistic behaviour, has not 
achieved the prominence that it has in some Western societies. 
An assessment of products liabiity risks to foreign manufacturers 
must take into account several factors which define the nature and 
extent of the economic risks concomitant to a decision to export to 
Japan. These include substantive tort liability, substantive contract 
liability, criminal liability, the effect of public insurance schemes, 
and the effect of procedural and evidentiary constraints in the liti- 
gation process. 
TOIT liability under the Civil Code does not require a direct ex- 
change relationship between the product supplier and product user 
" By 1981, there had apparently only been fifty reported cases where manu- 
facturers had been sued by injured consumers. Kitagawa, supra, note 38, 
at 4-9, n. I. 
" See Haley, supra, note 46. In a recent article Haley has expanded on this 
thesis: J. Haley, Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law 
Without Sanctions (1982) 8 J. OF JAPANESE STUDIES 274. 
50 The cornerstone of tort law in Japan is Article 709 of the Civil Code which 
provides that a "person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of 
another is bound to make compensation for damage arising therefrom". 
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as a precondition of liability, and as a result is more flexible than 
the traditional structured, bilateral concept of contract liability. I t  
is not surprising, therefore, that the judiciary has turned to delictual 
concepts as the preferred approach in their development of products 
liability law. In  addition, the conceptually vague nature of the ele- 
ments of tort liability permits the courts to apply a risk-utility 
analysis to the issues surrounding hazardous products, a task which 
is more diicult in contract, which remains constrained by con- 
sensual arrangements. 
Notwithstanding the marked differences between common law 
and civil law systems, the Japanese tort approach to products liabil- 
ity risks is comparable in many respects to that of its Canadian 
counterpart. Both are fault-based systems centred largely around 
the notion of liability for negligent conduct. Both use the concept of 
foreseeability to define the limits of legal responsibility, and both 
have compensation for injury as their principal objective. 
There are, however, several significant differences between the 
Canadian and Japanese systems, the first being the recognition of 
the right of recovery for pure economic loss in a tort action in Jap- 
anese law. The general rule in Canada has been that pure economic 
loss (economic loss not causally related to physical injury) is not 
re~overable.~~ In Japan, Article 710 of the Japanese Civil Code 
places the tortfeasor under an obligation to compensate for injury 
"irrespective of whether such injury was to the person, liberty, or 
reputation of another, or to such person's property rights". There is 
no distinction in Japanese tort law between recovery of economic 
losses and recovery for injury or property damage.'' 
Another area of divergence between the Canadian and Japanese 
tort systems is the frequency with which the respective governments 
are sued in negligence actions. As it is the Japanese government that 
must certify products as being fit for consumer use, the government 
must often defend allegations of state negligence concerning defective 
products. The Japanese do not recognize concepts of sovereign im- 
munity, and recent Japanese cases have apportioned government 
5' A. Linden, CANADIAN TORT LAW ( 1 g 8 2 ) ,  at 410-29. However, recent de- 
cisions in England and Canada suggest that pure economic loss may be 
recoverable. See D. Cohen, Bleeding Hearts and Peeling Floors: Compensa- 
tion for Economic Loss at the House of Lords ( 1 9 8 4 )  18 U.B.C. L. REV. 289; 
Kamloops v .  Nielsen, Hughes and Hughes [1984]  5 W.W.R. I ,  at 38-45 
(S.C.C.).  
58 Adachi, supra, note 38, at I I .  
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liability from thirty-three to as high as sixty per cent.59 Although 
government liability for negligent inspection is not unheard of in 
Canada, it is exceedingly rare.G0 
Apart from these spec& points, the articulation of liability in tort 
under the Japanese Civil Code is similar to Canadian tort concepts. 
In order to succeed in a tort action against a foreign manufacturer, 
a Japanese plaintiff must prove that: 
(1) the product was defective; 
(2) the defect resulted from the defendant's act; 
(3) the plaintiff suffered an injury; 
(4) the injury was caused by the defendant's product; and 
(5) the defendant violated a standard of care expected of him. 
Generally the plaintiff will have little difficulty in establishing the 
extent and nature of her property damage, personal injury or eco- 
nomic losses. She may, however, encounter serious evidentiary prob- 
lems in establishing the four remaining elements of liability. The 
Japanese judiciary, recognizing the plaintiff's difficulty, has adopted 
several techniques which improve the plaintiff's position to some 
degree. These include establishing the manufacturer's standard of 
care as near-absolute in some cases, and permitting proof of causa- 
tion through utilization of epidemiological data in others. 
The Japanese conception of a defective product may be articu- 
lated in three ways?' As in Canada, a product may be viewed as 
defective in design, in manufacture, or in the sufficiency of warnings 
and instructions which accompany it. Failure to provide adequate 
information or warnings of dangerous consequences associated with 
certain product uses may be considered to be a defect in product 
design as, for example, where a manufacturer supplies a liquid heat- 
ing agent without warning the user of its contamination by toxic 
" Yagi et al. v. Japan et al., Kanazawa District Court, 879 Hanrei Jiho 26, 
I March 1978; Oyama et al. v. Japan et al., Tokyo District Court 899 
Hanrei J io  48, 3 Aug. 1978. Adachi, supra, note 38, at  20. See also M. R. 
Reich, Public and Private Responses to a Chemical Disaster in Japan: The 
Case of Kanemi Yusho (1982) 15 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 102, at I 19. 
00 McCrea et al. v. White Rock et al. [I9751 2 W.W.R. 593, 56 D.L.R. (3d) 
525 (B.C.C.A.); Ostash et al. v. Sonnenberg et al. and Ostash et al. v. 
Aeillo [1g68] 63 W.W.R. 257, 67 D.L.R. (2d) 311 (Sask. C.A.); compare 
Barratt v. Corporation of the District of North Vancouver [1g80] 2 S.C.R. 
418, I 14 D.L.R. (3d) 577. 
G1 Kitagawa, supra, note 38, at 4-15. 
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chemicalsP2 In order to attract products liability in tort the defect 
must also pose some actual or potential risk to the health or safety 
of the user or other members of the p~blic.6~ 
The existence of a defect is determined by a state-of-the-art test 
applied at the date of the alleged negligen~e.~~ Where the design or 
manufacturing process in question is sophisticated, a plaintiff un- 
familiar with the relevant technology may face serious difficulty in 
proving the existence of the alleged defect?' I t  is true that the court 
may, in some cases, be willing to infer the existence of a defect from 
circumstantial evidence of unusual injury incurred during normal 
use. There are, however, recent decisions where plaintiffs' actions 
have failed because of an inability to prove the existence of the 
d e f e ~ t ? ~  Whether the plaintiff's injuries occur in isolation or instead 
are part of a larger products liability disaster will likely have a 
significant impact on this issue, as the Japanese courts apparently 
apply a risk-utility analysis to determine the existence of a defect?' 
The isolated plaintiff, without access to data demonstrating the ex- 
tent of the product safety risk, will often have considerable difficulty 
in establishing this element of tort liability. 
The plaintiff is also required to demonstrate that the defect was 
in fact the cause of his injury. Once again, victims face considerable 
obstacles. Not only will they be ignorant of the relevant technology, 
they may not have the resources or tools to pierce the veil of indus- 
trial secrecy surrounding many commercial and industrial enterprises 
in the absence of a discovery process?* 
62 Kubota v. Kanemi Soko K .K .  et al., Fukuoka District Court, 866 Hanrei 
Jiho 21, 5 Oct. 1977 (The Kanemi Cooking Oil Case). Reich, supra, note 
59, at  108. 
63 The word 'defect' translates into one of two Japanese words: kashi, which 
suggests that the product quality deviates from that which was the subject 
of the contract, and kekkan which implies that the defect is dangerous, the 
latter being the subject of products liability. 
6 V h e  Kanemi Cooking Oil Case, supra, note 62. 
65 For example, in the SMON cases, the Minister of Health and Welfare com- 
missioned a special research group to investigate the etiology of SMON, 
which took two and one half years to complete. See Terms of Settlement: 
The SMON Litigation (1979) 12 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 99, a t  101. 
66  See Ito v. Honda Giken K.K., Fukuoka District Court, 869 Hanrei Jiho 91, 
15 Feb. 1977. 
G7 I n  determining the drug companies' liability in the SMON litigation, the 
court noted that "all drugs. . . are double-edged swords producing both effi- 
cacious results and side-effects. . . . The usefulness of a drug is negated if it 
has disproportionately serious side-effects compared with its efficacy." Oyama 
v. lapan, Tokyo District Court, 838 Hanrei Jiho 29, 17 Jan. 1977, translated 
in ( I  978) I I LAW IN JAPAN 76, a t  85. 
68 See text accompanying notes 102-07. 
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The courts have adopted several methods to reduce the plaintiff's 
evidentiary burden in certain specific tort contexts. In pollution 
cases, where proof of causation can be particularly elusive, the injury 
usually multiple, and the defendant often economically powerful 
and perhaps unco-operative, the tools of epidemiological and statis- 
tical proof have been de~eloped.~' These developments have per- 
mitted legal causation to be established even where details of the 
precise mechanism describing the etiology of the plaintiff's injury 
is not clear,"' and where evidence of the specific source of pollution 
is within the control of the defendant." 
This approach is not representative of products liability cases in 
general, but a claim exhibiting the same essential characteristics of 
widespread physical harm and involving a high degree of techno- 
logical and scientific uncertainty may permit a plaintiff to establish 
causation through judicial acceptance of inferential techniques. In 
situations of isolated or minor injury, however, proof of specific 
causation remains a major obstacle to injured plaintiffs. Even where 
injuries are relatively numerous, a potential plaintiff may not be 
aware of, or have access to, relevant evidence regarding the fre- 
quency and incidence of injury to others who have chosen not to 
litigate. This problem tvill be exacerbated to the extent that indi- 
vidual Japanese plaintiffs choose not to single themselves out and 
take the initiative to litigate or to join plaintiff litigation associa- 
tions in the case of mass torts. 
The plaintiff must finally establish a violation of a standard of 
care expected of the defendant. Admittedly, in many cases, demon- 
stration of the defective product will lead to an inference of negli- 
gence on the part of the defendant. As in Canadian tort law, negli- 
gence is established through the application of an objective stan- 
dard to the situation of the particular defendant." The standard of 
69 Epidemiological proof alloxvs the plaintiff to establish causation by correlating 
such factors as seasonality, locality and chronology of symptoms with the pro- 
duction cycle of the pollutor. Statistical proof requlres correlation between a 
particular effluent and the incidence of disease. See Pollution Case Law 
(1973) no JAPAN QUARTERLY 251, at 251-55. 
70 See Upham, supra, note 48, at 608-09; Komatsu et al. v. Mitsui Kinzoku, 
Toyama District Court, 22 Kakyu Minshu (Nos. 5-6) Bessatsu I, 30 June 
1971; Toyama et al. v. Mitsui Kinzoku, Kanazawa Branch of Nagoya High 
Court, 674 Hanrei Jiho 25, g Aug. 1972. 
71 Ono et al. v. Showa Denko, Niigata District Court, 22 Kakyu Minshu (Nos. 
9-10) 29 Sept. 1971. 
72 Mitsubishi Jukogyo K.K. v. Kamesake, Tokyo High Court, 863 Hanrei Jiho 
47, 4 July 1977, held that an automobile dealer is not expected to detect 
latent design defects in automobiles. Kato v. Namo Seiyaku K.K., Tokyo 
District Court, 6 Kakyu Minshu IGO, 14 July 1955, held that a druggist is 
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care (the behaviour which the court determines a person ought to 
have exhibited), may be expected to vary with the expected private 
and social costs of the conduct in question. In cases involving the 
manufacture of food, drugs and automobiles (where defects present 
a significant social risk in terms of the frequency, nature and severity 
of personal injuries), the Japanese courts have imposed what is 
essentially an absolute duty on the defendanti3 both to produce a 
safe product and to monitor its safety on behalf of those persons 
who continue to use it. Where possible cases of public hazards are 
involved, enterprises are responsible for constant re-examination and 
supervision of goods in circ~lation.~~ 
This brief description of the Japanese 'tort' products liabiity re- 
gime suggests that the economic risks defined by substantive tort law 
in Japan do not differ significantly from those in Canada. Unlike 
manufacturers who export to the United States, Canadian exporters 
to Japan enjoy essentially the same protection from lawsuits created 
by concepts of fault and causation as exist in the domestic market. 
To some-extent the risks are increased in the case of exports, due to 
the recognition in Japan of recovery of economic losses, and the 
willingness of Japanese courts to accept inferential causation argu- 
ments. At the same time, the existence of potential state liability may 
offset the perceived increase in risk. In addition, liability in tort is 
simply one aspect of a much broader legal environment which en- 
compasses contract risks, the criminal law, and the reality of pros- 
pects of litigation which are faced by exporting manufacturers. An 
analysis of these aspects of potential liability offers additional in- 
sights into the impact of products liabiity on trade. 
The Japanese law of contract offers two general solutions to the 
problem of injuries associated with the use of defective products: 
not required to test the drugs he sells. Both cases held that the product 
manufacturer was liable in negligence for insufficient testing but in Kato, 
the damage award was only $140 U.S. as the court found that the manu- 
facturer was unaware of possible injury. 
73 The Kanemi Cooking Oil Case, supra, note 6 2 .  Negligence was prima facie 
inferred in a situation where a food manufacturer produced and marketed 
cooking oil contaminated with toxic polychlorinated biphenyls. During the 
1970s proposals for the establishment of a strict products liability regime 
received considerable study. T o  date, these reform proposals have not been 
implemented. See Fujita, supra, note 38, at 160. 
74 Oyama v.  Japan, supra, note 67, at 85 (translation). 
75 For an English language discussion of Japanese contract law in general, see 
W. Shattuck and Z. Kitagawa, UNITED STATES-JAPANESE CONTRACT AND 
SALE PROBLEMS ( I  973). 
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liabiity for imperfect performance of contractual 0bligations,7~ and 
liability for latent product defects.77 Imperfect performance liability 
is contingent on the seller's negligence and as a result is not strict, 
although the retailer is faced with displacing a presumption of neg- 
ligence?' Contractual liability for latent defects, because it is strict, 
is limited to the value of the damaged product itself," the popular 
judicial view being that responsibility for consequential losses should 
not be imposed in the absence of fault. 
Imperfect performance liabiity is couched in terms of obligees 
and obligors, and therefore applies only to contractual parties and 
not to foreign manufacturers. There are two exceptions to this "priv- 
ity" requirement which may be relevant to products liabiity risks. 
The first permits the court, in addition to holding the retailer liable, 
to subrogate the retailer's liability to the plaintiff against his distrib- 
utor or manufacturer. This gives the plaintiff access to both parties?' 
The other exception to the privity rule is judicial expansion of 
contract so as to extend the defendant's contractual duty of care to 
persons other than the actual purchaser who might reasonably be 
expected to use the product?' 
The potential contractual risks of Canadian manufacturers in the 
Japanese domestic consumer market must be taken to be relatively 
in~ignificant.'~ As well, the extent of damage recovery for breach of 
contract in Japanese law would seem to be consistent with that in 
7e Civil Code, Art. 415: "If an obligor fails to effect performance in accordance 
with the tenor and purport of the obligation, the obligee may demand com- 
pensation for damages." 
77 Civil Code, Ar t  570: "If any latent defects exist in the object of a sale, 
the provisions of Article 566 shall apply mutatis mutandii.. . ." Art. 566 
provides that "Where the object of a sale is subject to.. . [easement, pledge, 
etc.] . . . and the buyer was unaware thereof, he may rescind the contract 
only if the object of the contract cannot be attained thereby; in other cases 
the buyer may demand only compensation for damages." 
7' Fujita, supra, note 38, a t  163. 
70 Damages for personal injuries are therefore not recoverable, and since in 
most cases the value of the product itself relative to the injuries complained 
of is immaterial, the imperfect obligation alternative is more attractive to an 
injured consumer. 
80 Article 423; Kamimaki v. Ohashi, Gifu District Court, Ogaki Branch, 307 
Hanrei Taimuzu 87, 27 Dec. 1937 (The 'Egg-Tofu' Case). Where infected 
egg-tofu caused the death of two people and the poisoning of over 400 others, 
the manufacturer was held liable in tort, the retailer for imperfect perfor- 
mance, and the wholesaler by subrogation of the retaileis imperfect per- 
fonnance claim against the wholesaler. 
81  Id., where the heirs of the deceased (who had not purchased the product) 
brought the action on behalf of themselves and the victims. 
82 Niibori and Cosway, supra, note 52. 
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Canadian While the relaxation of the privity doctrine and 
the subrogation rights against manufacturers would seem to broaden 
contractual products liability risks in the case of Japanese consumers, 
there is no evidence in the responses from manufacturers in our 
survey that this risk is perceived as significant. 
C. CRIMINAL IABILITY 
In addition to facing potential civil liability in tort and contract 
for negligence related to defective products, certain individualss' 
within defendant organizations may be liable for criminal negligence 
under Article 2 I I of the Criminal Code." This provision imposes 
criminal liability where there is a violation of the duty of care 
"required in the conduct of his [one's] profession or occupation". 
Whether such criminal charges will be laid rests on the discretion of 
the public prosecutor, the exercise of which, in turn, will most often 
depend on the degree of negligence and the severity and frequency of 
the injuryP6 As in cases of civil liability, the duty of care imposed 
on an individual will vary with the inherent danger of the product 
and will be particularly high in the production of potentially high- 
risk products such as food and While criminal liability will 
not usually develop from the typical product liability case in Japan, 
the risk certainly exists. 
In light of the limited data on the criminalization of manufactur- 
ing enterprises in the cases of products liability suits in Canadass as 
83 H. T. Ricks, A Comparison of the Scope of Contract Damages in the United 
States and Japan (1978) 12 INT'L AWYER 105, at  107, 130. 
The defendant will usually be the person actually in charge of the negligent 
process and not the person only nominally in charge, such as directors or 
presidents. In  Japan v. Hayasaka, Sendai High Court, 846 Hanrei Jiho 43, 
10 Feb. 1977, a factory chief was acquitted but the manufacturing supervisor 
directly in charge was convicted. I n  1970, the Japanese Automobile Con- 
sumers' Union attempted to persuade the National Police Agency to charge 
Honda with criminal offences ranging from negligent manslaughter to at- 
tempted murder, relating to design defects in the Honda No. 360 sub- 
compact. See H. Otake, Corporate Power in Social Conflict: Vehicle Safety 
and Japanese Motor Manufacturers (1982) 10 INT. JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 
OF LAW 75, at  83-84. 
85 Criminal Code, Law No. 45, 1907. 
86 Niibori and Cosway, supra, note 52, a t  488-89. 
87 Japan v. Hayasaka, supra, note 84. The court held that because the product 
was intended for consumption by infants, forseeability of injury constitutes 
the slightest anxiety, however vague or uncertain, about the safety of the 
ingredients. 
We are unaware of any reported Canadian cases involving criminal liability 
for defective consumer products. The American experience is similar, al- 
though the Ford Pinto and Maverick cases are well known. See M. E. 
Wheeler, Product Liability, Civil or Criminal- The Pinto Litigation (1981) 
17 FORUM 250. 
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well as in Japan, it would be presumptuous to compare the risks 
faced by manufacturers in the domestic Canadian market and the 
Japanese export market. Our impression would be that the risks in 
b o a  cases would be marginal, and are unlikely to influence export 
decisions. 
In  assessing the relative risks faced by manufacturers exporting to 
Japan, one must be cognizant of the existence of state insurance 
programs which may result in the externalization of costs to the 
Japanese consumer-ta~payer.'~ Perhaps because of perceived inade- 
quacies in the ability of tort law to provide compensation for victims 
of particular classes of accident, the Japanese government has made 
efforts to implement a number of compulsory insurance programs?' 
These programs have been designed to ensure compensation for in- 
jured consumers and to shift their losses to those who may be in a 
better financial posititon to bear them, such as suppliers, employers 
and the state. Products liability risks to which foreign importers 
must respond may be significantly altered by these public insurance 
or compensation schemes. In cases where contributions to the fund 
are not required, the consumer will still be compensated and the 
manufacturer will escape liability costs completely. On the other 
hand if mandatory contributions by all manufacturers, both foreign 
and domestic, constitute the source of the insurance scheme's funds, 
then the manufacturer faces a present, fixed cost which replaces the 
future, uncertain cost of a damage award against him and may be 
less than or greater than that future cost, depending on the insurer's 
ability to assess the particular risk represented by this manufacturer's 
activities. 
Under Japanese workers' compensation law91 employees who are 
injured by a defective machine in their work environment can, after 
recovery of worker compensation scheme benefits, sue the negligent 
employer for any additional damage?' The court in this case may 
decide on joint and several liability of the employer and the manu- 
89 See G. Calabresi, TBE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS ( I  g70), at 248-49. 
90 For a detailed discussion of the justifications of these plans with particular 
emphasis on drug related injuries, see J. Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation 
Plans (1982) 30 Anr. J. COMP. LAW 297. 
01 Workmen's Accident Compensation Insurance Act (WACIA), Law No. 50, 
1947. See Kitagawa, supra, note 38, Vol. 6, Part XII, Ch. 2 for a summary 
of the relevant law- 
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facturer. I t  is only if there is no fault on the part of the employer 
that the employee may consider suing the manufacturer of the defec- 
tive machine for additional damages. This is unlikely since most 
Japanese collective labour agreements apparently contain a clause 
establishing a right of recovery of such damages from the employer.93 
It is clear that where worker compensation benefits are paid out to 
an injured employee, the products liability costs for foreign as well 
as domestic manufacturers of defective machines and tools are sig- 
nificantly reduced. The Japanese "no fault" automobile insurance 
schemes4 has a similar impact on manufacturers of defective vehicles 
or automobile parts. The Automobile Indemnification Guarantee 
Acts5 imposes strict liability on the owner-operator of a vehicle in- 
volved in an automobile accident, and since minimum private insur- 
ance is compulsory, the private insurer must bear the loss or seek 
indemnification from the manufacturers6 
In addition to these public insurance funds which socialize risk in 
certain sectors of Japanese society, compensation schemes are also 
common in Japan. These schemes are funded by mandatory con- 
tributions from manufacturers and are designed to provide compen- 
sation for injuries caused by specific products. For example, under 
the Consumer Products Safety Act:? an association is charged with 
the procurement of products liability insurance for all products 
granted the 'SG' mark." The insurance is funded through the pro- 
ceeds from fees paid by manufacturers for mandatory safety stickers. 
Compensation awards up to a maximum of twenty million yens9 per 
person are paid where the association determines that the manufac- 
turer is legally liable. The Drug Side Effects Injuries Relief Fund 
92 A 1980 amendment to the WACIA introduced a set-off provision between 
WCI Pension Benefits and civil damages. WACIA, Art. 67 (Law No. 104, 
1g80), effective I Dec. 1981. 
93 Kitagawa, supra, note 38, a t  4-27. 
A summary of these plans is contained in W. Shimeall, No-Fault Auto Insur- 
ance: T h e  Japanese Experience ( I 973) g Fo~uar 771. 
95 Law No. 97, 1955, Art. 3. 
96 According to Kitagawa, this type of case is rarely reported: supra, note 38, 
a t  4-28. 
97 Law No. 31, 1973. 
98 While this mark is often compared with the Good Housekeeping Seal of 
Approval, the similarities are not as compelling as they might first appear. 
The significance which is attached to this type of standard by a very large 
percentage of Japanese consumers is unparalleled in North America. See text 
accompanying notes I 5 I -6 I. 
99 This figure is for 1982. 
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Actloo also depends on mandatory manufacturers' contributions 
which are assessed in proportion to sales, and are partially dependent 
on a risk rate. The maximum benefit awarded is considerably below 
the expected tort damages awards because of the exclusion of non- 
pecuniary loss and the limitation on compensation for economic 
loss.101 
Canadian manufacturers enjoy similar benefits under provincial 
health care insurance programs and worker compensation programs 
to the extent that the ex ante contributions to the scheme do not 
coincide with actual expected accident costs, and to the extent 
that Canadian compensation programs do not contemplate cost re- 
covery through exercise of subrogation rights. Again, empirical evi- 
dence as to the relative degree to which public insurance and com- 
pensation programs will externalize costs is lacking, although even 
this perfunctory assessment suggests that the Canadian manufacturer 
may benefit from his export decisions in the case of specific products. 
The liability of a foreign enterprise may arise in several contexts, 
~vhich will have a direct effect on the probability of a lawsuit being 
brought, and the probability of a successful claim being pursued. 
First, the importer to Japan (although controlled by a foreign enter- 
prise) may itself be a Japanese legal entity. Second, the foreign 
enterprise may itself be named as a foreign litigant in defence of an 
action by a Japanese consumer. Third, a domestic enterprise or dis- 
tributor may seek to protect itself from liability by joining the foreign 
manufacturer in the products liability suit. Whatever the relationship 
of the parties, the potential liability of foreign based manufacturer- 
defendants will be directly affected by certain procedural constraints 
which reduce the likelihood of successful litigation. These include 
the jurisdiction of the Japanese court, the choice of law, and the 
availability of evidence to the plaintiff in the preparation of her 
case. 
The general rules regarding the jurisdiction of a Japanese court 
are found in Articles I and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These 
sections provide that the defendant's domicile102 is determinative, but 
100 Law No. 68, 1979. 
101 Presently $7,000 for a personal injury pension and $6,160 for a bereaved 
family pension: Fleming, supra, note go, at 43. 
102 Article 21 defines domicile as "the principal place of living". 
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that where the domicile is not in Japan or cannot be determined, the 
defendant's residence shall prevail. Thus it appears that the juris- 
dictional issue will often be determined in favour of the foreign 
enterprise. There are, however, several subsidiary rules which may 
alter this result. Where the defendant is a foreign corporation or 
association, its usual forum is considered to be the place of its "office, 
place of business or person in charge of the affairs thereof in 
Japan".los With respect to tort claims, the Code of Civil Procedure 
permits an action to be brought "before the court of the place where 
the act was committed".lM This has been interpreted judicially to 
mean either the place of the tortious conduct or the place where the 
injury occurred.lo5 As most products liability claims will be articu- 
lated as tort claims, this is perhaps the most significant provision 
under which the Japanese court may assume jurisdiction. Where 
the products liability claim is expressed as a contract claim, the 
consumer-plaintiff's residence usually determines the forum.loG In 
view of the Code's provisions there is a significant possibility that at 
least some Japanese consumer-plaintiffs will be forced to sue in 
Canada if they are to recover compensation. The costs of transna- 
tional litigation are apt to be substantial. 
Once it is determined that the Japanese court will assume juris- 
diction over the foreign enterprise, the court must then determine 
which national substantive law will apply to determine liability: the 
law of the defendant's jurisdiction (that is, Canada) or the substan- 
tive law of Japan. An injury occurring in Japan will generally give 
103 Code of Civil Procedure, Ar t  4, par. 3. Note that Article 429 of the Com- 
mercial Code requires that any corporation doing continuous business in 
Japan establish an office and representative in Japan. Article 4 has been 
invoked even where the office was relatively t emporq  and informal. George 
v .  International Air Service Co. Tokyo District Court, 16 Rodo Reishu 308, 
26 April 1965. The strictness of the rule is apparently tempered through 
application of discretionary principles which provide for its relaxation where 
"justice and reason" call for an alternative forum. Y. Nomura, Japanese 
Court Jurisdiction in Transnational Litigation ( I 984) 3 I OSAKA UNN. L. 
REV. 21, at  30-33. 
104 Id., Art. 15. 
105 For example, Japanese victims of an airplane crash who alleged defects in 
the design of the aircraft brought suits in Japan against the American 
manufacturers: Yabutani v .  The Boeing Company, Tokyo District Court, 
754 HANREI JIHO 58, 24 July 1974, translated in (1975) 19 JAP. ANNUAL 
OF INT'L LAW 225. See generally A. Gotoh, Products Liability and Inter- 
national Jurisdiction (1977) 21 JAP. ANNUAL OF INT'L LAW 15. 
106 Article 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure grants jurisdiction to "the court 
situated in the place of performance" of the duty which, in Japan, is taken 
to mean the duty to pay damages for breach of contract. See generally 
Dicey and Morris, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (10th ed. 1980), a t  209. 
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rise to the application of Japanese tort law?07 Moreover, even where 
foreign law is applicable, if the events in question do not constitute 
a tort under Japanese law, Japanese law will apply to absolve the 
defendant from liability notwithstanding that foreign law may im- 
pose legal responsibility?08 Thus where foreign liabiity is strict but 
where the parallel Japanese liability is fault-based, fault must be 
established. 
The liability of a foreign manufacturer is also affected by eviden- 
tiary rules which may operate to its advantage. In Japan there is no 
parallel to the Canadian interrogatory or discovery procedures 
by which evidence can be obtained prior to trial under the authority 
of la1v?09 Apart from the office of the public prosecutor:'O cmly the 
Japanese court has the authority to demand the production of evi- 
dence? and a foreign party must therefore enlist its assistance to 
do so. The Japanese court will render its assistance only when offi- 
cially requested by the foreign state:12 and this process can take up 
to a full year to complete?13 Even where the Japanese court does 
exercise its authority, non-disclosure privileges granted by the Code 
of Civil Pr~cedure"~ are substantial, particularly in the area of in- 
107 Law concerning the Applications of Laws in General, Law No. 10, 1898, 
Art. I I. Para. I provides that tort disputes should be "governed by the law 
of the place where the facts forming the cause of such obligation have 
occurred". Although this provision is unclear, academic and judicial opinion 
suggest this interpretation. See also Kitagawa, supra, note 38, a t  Part XIV, 
5-64; Toho K.K. v. Hachisuka Tokyo District Court, 16 Kaminshu 923, 
27 May 1965. Admittedly, Japanese law relating to international products 
claims is not well-developed. See Gotoh, supra, note 105, a t  I 7, I 9. 
108 Id., A r t  I I, par. 2. 
lm Kitagawa, supra, note 38, at  Part XIV, 5-93; Fujita, supra, note 38, at  
174-75- 
110 Fujita, id. Only the office of the Public Prosecutor has the power to take 
compulsory depositions and to subpoena evidence. 
111 See Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 271 on examination of witnesses, and Art  
314 on the production of documents. 
11' Kitagawa, supra, note 38, a t  Part XIV, 5-103. This is usually accomplished 
by 'Letters Rogatory' and carries a number of conditions including the pro- 
vision of a detailed list of questions and a guarantee of reciprocity from the 
foreign state. 
113 Id., a t  5-104. 
1" Under Articles 280 and 281 a witness may refuse to testify where i t  may 
lead to criminal prosecution or disgrace for himself, his family or his em- 
ployees, or where it relates to technical or professional secrets. Under Article 
312, the holder of a document may refuse to produce it except where he has 
referred to i t  in litigation, where the person demanding it has a right to it, 
or where the document establishes a legal relation between the parties. 
Under Article 313, the person demanding the document must first set out 
its nature and the fact to be proved by i t  
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dustrial secrets, and thus an effort to obtain pre-trial evidence will 
be expensive and may prove to be fruitless. These restrictions on 
pre-trial access to information seriously prejudice the establishment 
of a products liability claim and present the most difficult hurdle for 
a plaintiff in the Japanese legal system. 
In addition, the plaintiff in most products liability cases in Japan 
will usually be acting as an individual. Japanese law does not con- 
template representative class actions, and thus formal collective ac- 
tion and the benefits of representative products liability suits are not 
possible. Procedural rules require that the individuals be enumer- 
ated in the statement of claim, and that the representative must be 
chosen by and from the group.''' Moreover, the size of the group 
is limited by jurisdictional rules which require, in the case of tort 
claims, that a plaintiff bring hi action in one of two forums: either 
the place where the injury occurred or the place where the unlawful 
act was committed.l16 As most widespread injuries will occur across 
a number of jurisdictions, an all-inclusive plaintiff group is only pos- 
sible if the claim is brought in the jurisdiction where the act was 
committed and this, of course, would reduce the convenience and 
increase the cost of a group action. It should be noted, however, 
that collective plaintiff groups may be organized which may never- 
theless achieve essentially the same result by less formal means. In 
multiple injury cases it is not uncommon for victims to form asso- 
ciations through which the preparation of the case can be managed 
and pursuant to which the defendant is encouraged to settle the 
claims out of court.l17 
. From even this cursory examination of Japanese products liability 
law it is possible to draw the following general conclusions: 
(1) The non-litigious behaviour of Japanese consumers makes the 
115 Articles 46 and 47 permit representation in bringing or defending a suit to 
groups or associations not having the status of juridical persons, and Articles 
59-63 govern co-litigants. If the group members are not enumerated in the 
statement of claim as co-litigants under Article 59, then a representative 
must be chosen and hi authority certified in writing pursuant to Article 52. 
116 For example, in the SMON litigation, decisions were rendered in nine dif- 
ferent district courts. Terms of Settlement, supra, note 65, at 102. Similarly, 
the Kanemi Yusho cooking oil disaster was resolved in three separate trials. 
See Reich, supra, note 59, a t  106, 109. 
117 Again, in the SMON litigation, the victims were represented by a t  least 
twenty patient groups with a national liaison council. See Terms of Settle- 
ment, id., a t  99-1 17. See Reich, id. 
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probability of a products liability claim being brought against 
the Canadian exporter relatively small. 
(2) The probability of pursuit or success of a products liability claim 
against the Canadian manufacturer is greatly reduced by the 
absence of a discovery process resulting in the Japanese con- 
sumer being confronted with formidable evidentiary problems. 
(3) The use of risk-utility analysis by the Japanese courts may mean 
that, unless there is evidence of widespread injury caused by a 
specific Canadian product, the existence of a defect and cau- 
sation may be difficult to prove. 
(4) Canadian manufacturers do not face strict contractual liability 
in Japan (in respect of liability for personal injury and prop- 
erty damagells), while manufacturers producing for the Cana- 
dian market may in certain provinces and circumstances11s be 
held strictly liable to compensate for injuries caused by defective 
goods. 
(5) Canadian companies may benefit from the joining of the Jap- 
anese government as a defendant in products liability cases.120 
The state may be jointly and severally liable with the manufac- 
turer. While a finding of negligent state approval or inspection 
does not absolve the manufacturer, it will usually reduce the 
cost of liability."l 
(6) Canadian exporting manufacturers face products liability darn- 
age awards which as a general matter, and at least on a com- 
parative basis, are significantly lower than those faced in 
Canada.122 
118 By the Act Concerning the Applications of Laws, Art. I I, even if foreign 
law is applicable to the particular products liability claim, if the events do 
not constitute a tort under Japanese law, then the latter applies. Thus if 
foreign liability is strict, and Japanese liability is fault based, fault must 
always be established. 
1x9 I n  Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, consumers can sue manufacturers 
directly to recover compensation for personal injury and property damage 
resulting from a breach of implied contractual obligations relating to product 
quality. Consumer Products Warranties Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. C-go, s. 11; 
Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1, s. 12. 
It is also possible for a consumer to recover compensation without proof 
of negligence from a manufacturer based upon express statements contained 
in informational material distributed by him. Murray v. Sperry Rand Cor- 
poration (1979) 23 O.R. (2d) 456 (ONT. H.C.); Naken v. General Motors 
of Canada Ltd. (1978) 2 I O.R. (2d) 780~92  D.L.R. (3d) roo (ONT. C.A.), 
appeal allowed on other grounds [1983] I S.C.R. 72, 144 D.L.R. (3d) 385. 
120 The State Redress Act, Art. I grants compensation for intentional or negli- 
gent harm inflicted by a civil servant in the course of his duties. I t  should 
be noted that state liability is secondary in nature. 
121 I n  both the thalidomide and SMON litigation, the government was held 
responsible for approximately one third of the damage awards. 
12 In  the thalidomide litigation, the average award was $133,ooo per child, 
$13,000 for parents and $13,ooo for legal fees. I n  The Kanemi Cooking Oil 
Case, supra, note 62, the average award from a manufacturers' compensation 
fund for skin and kidney diseases was $70,000. 
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These conclusions are confirmed by an analysis of products liabil- 
ity insurance behaviour by enterprises in Japan. In general, Japanese 
firms do not appear to consider this type of insurance to be essential. 
In 1977, only 24% of Japanese manufacturers carried this variety 
of coverage despite the fact that this protection is relatively inexpen- 
sive.lZ3 This contrasts with their American counterparts, 86% of 
whom subscribe to products liability insurance?24 In addition, prod- 
ucts liability insurance appears to be of negligible concern to Cana- 
dian manufacturers who are considering exporting to Japan?" 
These observations reflect a situation where both the degree of risk 
and the magnitude of loss associated with the occurrence of products 
liability claims may be so low as to justify a company selling in the 
Japanese market dispensing with products liability insurance alto- 
gether. That is, whether societal norms discourage litigation, whether 
the legal system itself precludes access to the court system, or 
whether even successful products liability claims represent relatively 
minor costs, manufacturers marketing potentially defective products 
in Japan can expect less serious legal consequences than their Jap- 
anese counterparts in most cases can expect in North America. 
In summary, a Canadian manufacturer considering the Japanese 
market is not likely to perceive products liability risks as a major 
deterrent to especially in comparison with other potential 
markets such as the United States or the European Economic Com- 
munity where the risks associated with defective products are per- 
123 Economic Planning Board, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE BURDEN OF COM- 
PENSATION FOR INJURY (1980), cited in Adachi, supra, note 38, a t  60. The 
cost of this coverage ranges from -01% to 3% of gross sales and insurance 
companies offer i t  a t  a loss in order to compete for other insurance business. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Final Report of the Industry Study, INTER- 
AGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY (vol. I, 1977), at IV-25. The 
report also indicates that the average cost was .281% of gross sales in 1976, 
at  IV-33. According to an informal survey undertaken by the Ontario Law 
Reform Commission in 1978, the cost of products liability insurance in 
Canada was approximately .5% of gross sales in 1976. Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, REPORT ON PRODUCT LIABILITY ( I 979), a t  72. 
125 The responses to the authors' questionnaire presented two common scenarios. 
In  some cases, the firm's previous insurance policy covered its products 
worldwide, while in other cases the company indicated that the perceived 
risk of Japanese products liability claims was insufficient to warrant a new 
or extended policy to cover Japanese exports. 
126 This conclusion was confirmed by the responses in questionnaires received 
from Canadian manufacturers. I n  fact, the low products liability costs are 
an attractive feature of the Japanese market for Canadian firms exporting 
there. 
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ceived to be more This perception of litigation risks ac- 
knowledges that regulation of product quality in Japan is carried 
out by a mixture of formal and informal prospective controls by the 
state, and by ex post tort litigation designed to internalize social costs 
with an emphasis on the former regulatory tool. Most societies, in- 
cluding Canada and Japan, have chosen a mixture of the two meth- 
ods. Yet one cannot stress too heavily the dramatic difference in the 
relative balance between the methods which have been adopted in 
Japan, as compared to that in Canada or the United States. As 
recently as 1967 a comprehensive study of Japan products liability 
law uncovered no products liability lawsuits against Japanese retail- 
ers and wholesalers.128 
This is not to say that Canadian manufacturers can anticipate 
escaping substantial adverse commercial, social and market conse- 
quences if they export defective or dangerous goods to Japan. Con- 
siderabIy different values are at play in Japan with respect to both 
commercial and private dealings. Western business enterprises may 
be faced with consistent and pervasive expectations of Japanese con- 
sumers, commercial agents, and even state officials, to assume volun- 
tarily responsibility for their shortcomings in situations where we 
might very well assume that legal coercion would be both adequate 
and appr~priate.'~~ 
IV. JAPANESE STANDARDS AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 
A technical standard may be defined as any law, regulation, speci- 
fication or other requirement with respect to the properties of a 
product or the manner, condition or circumstances under which a 
m7 See Committee on Consumer Policy, SAFETY OF CONSUMER PRODUCTS: 
POLICY AND LEGISLATION I  OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES (1980)~ at  50; 
H. Tebbens, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILITY: A STUDY OF COMPARA- 
TIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY (1979). 
For a discussion of the insurance practices of Canadian manufacturers ex- 
porting to "strict liability" markets, see P. Halpern and J. Carr, Consumer 
and Corporate Affairs Canada, LIABILITY RULES AND INSURANCE MARKETS 
(1981)~ at  22, 70-71. 
Niibori and Cosway, supra, note 52. 
129 In some of the multiple injury cases (see supra, notes 48, 53, and 59), 
out-of-court settlements provided for the establishment of foundations which 
handled the health care, educational, and employment problems of the vic- 
tims. See also P. Lansing and M. Wechselblatt, Doing Business in Japan: 
The Importance of the Unwritten Law (1983) 17 INT'L LAWYER 647, at 
653. Kitigawa says, however, that the consumer's filing of a products liability 
suit provided a "strong impetus" for the manufacturer to agree to such a 
settlement: supra, note 38, a t  4-38. 
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product is produced or marketed.130 While compliance with stan- 
dards may not be mandatory under Japanese law, it may nonethe- 
less be advisable because of a consumer preference for goods that 
display a mark known to them to represent an acceptable level of 
quality or safety. Sometimes standards and associated certification 
marks provide the consumer with information by assuring him that 
goods conform to a certain level of quality or safety.13' In addition, 
they may permit him to make comparisons of products manufactured 
domestically and abroad.13' Thus, standards not only serve a con- 
sumer protection purpose, but also reduce information search costs, 
and facilitate the exchange of goods in the marketplace by promot- 
ing their inter~hangeability.'~~ 
Despite these trade facilitating effects, standards may also ad- 
versely influence the movement of goods across national borders. 
Since standards may be tailored to domestic technical experience 
and expertise, and to domestic consumer and industrial needs, they 
frequently have the effect of distorting international trade. A com- 
pany that manufactures to its domestic standards will be at a 
competitive disadvantage in a foreign market if a foreign state de- 
mands higher or even different standards. This may or may not be 
the intended result, since it is the disparity in standards which is 
responsible for this trade barrier. Whether the purpose of the stan- 
dard is the protection of domestic industry or the promotion of a 
legitimate domestic policy objective, and whether one standard is 
perceived to be stricter than another is irrelevant to its impact on 
trade. While international harmonization of standards appears to 
be the underlying rationale of many international standards organi- 
zations and trade agreements, its complete realization is clearly an 
unrealistic goal. There will always exist differing national values, 
priorities and physical circumstances which make uniform interna- 
tional standards inappr~priate.'~~ 
130 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 26th Supp., 
1979 (also referred to as the GATT Standards Code). For a detailed dis- 
cussion of the rationale and effects of standards, see D. Lecraw (Economic 
Council of Canada), VOLUNTARY STANDARDS AS A REGULATORY DEVICE :
WORKING PAPER NO. z3 (1981) ; R. Legget, STANDARDS IN CANADA (1970). 
'3' See text accompanying notes 154-61 for a discussion of quality marks in the 
Japanese market. 
132 See Legget, supra, note 130, a t  201-og. 
'33 Id., at  209-23. 
'34 Sweeney, supra, note zg, a t  186. The Preamble to the Standards Code rec- 
ognizes the right of a country to enact "measures necessary to ensure the 
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In addition, the standards setting process may adversely affect 
international trade. Imports may be reduced where there is inade- 
quate information respecting standards available to foreign manu- 
facturers, where insufficient notice of regulatory standard reform is 
given to foreign enterprises, or where foreign companies are not 
formally represented on committees which promulgate standards, or 
cannot participate effectively in informal business-government rela- 
tionships. Finally, procedures which implement standards such as 
testing, certification, and labelling and packaging requirements may 
operate as obstacles to international trade. 
For the foreign manufacturer, these difficulties related to stan- 
dards represent costs which, although difficult to quantify, will affect 
the price or profitability of its product in a foreign market. These 
costs may take numerous forms, including search costs, costs of 
changing design or production testing and certification 
fees, or delay costs. The result may be a loss of competitive advan- 
tage since domestic manufacturers which need to satisfy only one 
standard may take advantage of economies of scale. Ultimately, as a 
result of these trade-restricting effects, the market can expect a 
decrease in imports, and a concomitant increase in the price of re- 
maining imports,ls6 or perhaps in the price of domestic goods. 
If international trade negotiations are to progress, it must be 
determined whether the operation of particular standards as trade 
impediments can be considered fair and legitimate; that is, whether 
they are to be classified as protecti~nistl~~ or rather are to be assessed 
quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, of the environment., or for the prevention of deceptive practices", or 
"for the protection of its essential security interest". 
13Wanufacturers may find i t  more profitable not to make this type of change, 
but rather may choose to modify and reconstruct the final product to comply 
with the standards of a particular export market. Costs may nevertheless 
still be significant. For example, i t  is estimated that tear-down and recon- 
struction of American automobiles in Japan to meet various standards re- 
quirements (such as emission standards) adds over $1,000 to the price of 
each vehicle: TASK FORCE REPORT (1g7g), supra, note 7, a t  29-30. 
138 Id. The price of the Volkswagen Golf apparently increases by one third as a 
result of 41 Japanese technical regulations: Hohe Hiirden fur Importautos, 
Die Zeit, 29 May 1981, cited in J. Bourgeois, The Tokyo Round Agreements 
on Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement in International and 
EEC Perspcctiue (1982) 19 Coar. MKT. L. h v .  5, at note 7. 
137 This assumes that trade barriers which have as their sole purpose the pro- 
tection of domestic industry are undesirable as unnecessary impediments to 
the free flow of international trade. Inherent in thii position is an assump- 
tion, or perhaps an objective, that uncompetitive domestic industries should 
be abandoned, and resources should be reallocated to industries that are 
competitive internationally. According to some economists this would result 
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as economically or culturally justified domestic policies. In the next 
section we present a simplified and generalized outline of the most 
common standards barriers which have been encountered by North 
American business enterprises in attempting to do business in Japan. 
I t  should be borne in mind that this area is rapidly changing and 
numerous recent Japanese trade liberalization measures have already 
had a significant impact on specific industries and 
A foreign manufacturer's first contact with the Japanese product 
standards system traditionally occurred when import approval was 
sought. In order to ensure at an early stage that potential imports 
met the requisite standards, the Japanese government required de- 
tailed and comprehensive disclosure of all pertinent information on 
approval applications,l40 which often had to be accompanied by a 
product sample. Inaccurate information had serious results: a cos- 
metics company that mistakenly wrote "annex" instead of "head 
office" on its application was ordered by Japanese customs officials 
to recall all of its lipstick cases from the market."' In addition, im- 
port applications were required to be submitted through a resident 
company, usually a Japanese trading company. Thus the foreign 
exporter, even before his product entered the market, was faced 
with trade barriers, as the disclosure requirements represent increased 
costs and greater 1isks.1~' First, there was the possibility of delay 
-. - - 
in consumer savings, increased investment opportunity, technological inno- 
vation and lower inflation. See Cline, supra, note 36, at  6-7. See also Jack- 
son, supra, note 16, a t  325. 
13s See F. Coccodrilli, Dispute Settlement Pursuant to the Agreement on Tech- 
nical Barriers T o  Trade: The  United States-Japan Metal Bat Dispute 
(1983-84) 7 FORD. INT'L L.J. 137. 
1 s  To talk of a unitary Japanese standards system is perhaps misleading since 
the various standards schemes regulating diierent products are obviously 
administered by different private and governmental bodies, and in the latter 
case are established under the authority of widely differing Acts, such as the 
Road Vehicles Act, No. I 05 ( I 960), Electrical Appliances and Materials 
Control Law, No. 234 (1961 ), and the Consumer Product Safety Law, No. 
31 (1973). For a brief summary of the effect of these and other laws on 
imports, see JETRO, JAPAN'S IMPORT SYSTEM ( I 978). 
I* For example, a manufacturer may be required to provide a complete list of 
ingredients, processing details or product test results. 
Foreign Firms are Irked Over Needless Procedures, supra, note 18 ,at 3. 
Another example is cited in which approval was denied where the spaces 
between the figures in the production date (year, month, date) were too 
wide. 
142 See generally, C. Wunsch, Trade Secret Confidentiality and Toxic Sub- 
stances Regulation: A Non-Tariff Trade Barrier in the Chemical Trade, 
(1981 ) 14 CORN. INT'L .J. 173. 
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because of uncertainty about the sufficiency of the disclosed informa- 
tion. Second, there was the risk of proprietary information being 
released to competito~s by Japanese authorities, resulting in a sub- 
sequent loss of market share.14= Third, the residency requirement 
effectively committed a foreign exporter to a particular Japanese 
agent, since witching import agents entailed reapplication for im- 
port approval with all of its associated costs. 
A related problem for foreign manufacturers concerned the Jap- 
anese import classification system. The decision on the part of offi- 
cials as to the classification of an imported product determined 
which standards, quotas and duties (if any) were applicable, and 
clearly affected the manufacturer's competitive position. These de- 
cisions sometimes appeared to be discriminatory in cases where a 
product fell into several possible groups due to the existence of 
overlapping classifications. For example, despite a commitment 
made by the Japanese government to the international community 
to remove duties on all automobile parts, some Canadian manufac- 
turers of automobile windshields were obliged to pay duties because 
their products were given more specific customs classifications such 
as "laminated glass". Apparently, the more specific code prevailed 
in such cases?" 
If the exporter was successful in obtaining approval, his product 
next had to be submitted to Japanese customs officials, at which 
point there was also potential for costly delaysT5 For example, at 
one time Canadian lumber was required to be inspected piece by 
143 The danger for a foreign finn exporting to Japan is that its product may be 
effectively barred from the market when its technology is released to com- 
petitors who may have lower production costs. 
144 This problem was brought to our attention in one of the questionnaire 
responses and was being investigated by the Canadian embassy in Tokyo, 
during the summer of I 983. 
A Canadian manufacturer of potato granules was faced with stringent 
Japanese specifications to be met by their product until the Japanese officials 
were convinced that there had been an incorrect classification, and that 
potato flake standards were inappropriate for this particular product. See 
I?. Weil and N. Glick, Japan - Is the Market Open? A View of the Japan- 
ese Market Drawn from U.S. Corporate Experience (1979) 11 LAW AND 
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 845, a t  864-65 for a case in which reclassification of 
potato chips resulted in an increase in duty from 16% to 35%. 
1" Id., a t  864. An American manufacturer of electronic components found that 
at  Japanese Customs each control had to be disassembled, photographed, 
and reassembled before it could be sold on the Japanese market. Of course, 
Canadian bureaucrats have used similar tactics to impede the importation 
of Japanese products. See Tighter Customs Inspections Slow Flow of lap-  
anese Cars, supra, note g. 
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piece.lM In  addition, there has been some concern expressed by 
Western exporters that standards and customs rules were capable 
of being used at this stage to discourage "non-essential" imports in 
the pursuit of other government policy objectives.14' At this time, as 
a t  the import approval stage, Japanese custom officials verified 
whether the relevant Japanese standards had been complied with. 
Although the specific standards regulations applicable to a particular 
product depend upon its classificatiton, one can recognize several 
common standards problems faced by foreign exporters both at the 
approval stage and when the product passed through customs. 
First, many Japanese standards regulated the design rather than 
the performance characteristics of a product, making it possible for 
goods to have performance attributes which were superior to those 
of a corresponding conforming product, but making these goods 
susceptible to rejection by Japanese officials because of minor dif- 
ferences in design.14' In order to penetrate the market it became 
necessary for foreign companies to implement costly design and pro- 
duction technique changes. This factor has also had a negative effect 
on product innovation because a manufactureis investments in 
product improvements sometimes resulted in rejection of the product 
by Japanese customs 0fficia1s.l~~ 
Another area of difficulty which often confronted exporters is the 
Japanese "positive list" approach to harmful substances in food, 
clothing, agricultural products, packaging, cosmetics and pharma- 
ceuticals. Rather than maintaining a list of prohibited or restricted 
substances, the Japanese government lists in its regulations those 
146 This barrier has since been removed. See Minutes of Proceedings and Evi- 
dence of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, 
17 Feb. 1981, a t  38:8. 
147 Several Canadian manufacturers contacted by the author expressed a con- 
cern that trade barriers to their particular product appeared particularly 
insurmountable a t  times when Japan had exchange problems. Decisions made 
by low-level Japanese bureaucrats may be subject to review by the Office of 
Trade Ombudsman, which was established by the Japanese as part of their 
trade liberalization measures. 
I* For example, an American electrical cord was barred from the Japanese 
market because its strands were thicker than those making up cords manu- 
factured to Japanese standards. The thickness was not related to perfor- 
mance. See Weil and Glick, supra, note 144, a t  866. 
Similarly, American metal baseball bats were denied entry when the JSBB 
(Japanese Rubberized Baseball League) established design standards relat- 
ing to the alloy used in the bats and to the inclusion of rubber plugs in the 
ends of the bats. See supra, note 138, a t  150. The use of design standards 
may violate Art. 2.4 of the AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE, 
supra, note 130. 
149 Weil and Glick, supra, note I&. 
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ingredients which are permitted, for which uses, and in what 
amounts.150 If for example a new fwd  product contains an additive 
not included in the ~ o o d  Sanitation ~e&lations, or if it contains an 
approved additive in larger amounts than permitted, it is denied 
import approval, or is rejected at customs. If the foreign enterprise 
can demonstrate that the additive is harmless, a procedure exists 
pursuant to which approval may be granted afterseveral months. 
These potential or actual delays sometimes necessitate more expen- 
sive production techniques to ensure product stability and longer 
shelf life:51 and there is always an increased risk of product re- 
jection. 
These difficulties were joined by product certification barriers. As 
a general rule, until the introduction of recent trade liberalization 
measures, product testing to determine conformity to standards had 
to be carried out in Japan, and foreign laboratory test data were 
unacceptable;lJ2 In addition, any modification to the product trig- 
gered re-certification problems. This peculiarity of the Japanese stan- 
dards system clearly represented delays, risks and costs for the foreign 
exporter, especially where standards were unavailable in English, or 
when the reasons for rejection by the Japanese testing authority were 
unarticulated. This barrier has been a source of considerable friction 
in Japanese trade relations especially in view of the fact that many 
Western countries generally accept foreign (Japanese) test 
In addition, imports have explicitly or implicitly been denied ac- 
cess to various Japanese marks of q~a1i ty . l~~ For example, the Japan 
Industrial Standard ( JIS)155 mark of quality is awarded after testing 
not merely samples of the product but also the plant, equipment, 
150 See TASK FORCE REPORT (1980)~ supra, note 7, a t  31. 
151 A Canadian firm exporting cookies to Japan reported this experience in the 
authors' survey. 
152  \Veil and Glick, supra, note 144, a t  871-72. See Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS ON THE AGREE- 
MENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE -"STANDARDS CODE" ( 1983)~ 
a t  21. 
153 TASK FORCE REPORT (1979)~ supra, note 7, at  21. See text accompanying 
notes 163-70 for a description of the trade liberalization measures in - this 
context. 
154 Jackson, supra, note 16, a t  327. Examples of Japinese certification marks are 
JIS, JAS (Japan Agricultural Standard), SG or S. The latter bvo standards 
indicate the product has been approved under the Consumer Products 
Safety Act, Law No.'QI, 1973, and are mandatory for certain mariufactured 
goods includingptessure cookers and baseball bats. The SG mark indicates 
that the manufacturer participates in an insurance program established by 
the Product Safety Association. See supra, note 138, a t  149. 
155 See Lecraw, supra, note 130, Appendix B, a t  50-52. 
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and quality control system of the manufacturer. While the mark is 
voluntary (except where it is adopted as mandatory by legisla- 
ti01-1'~~)~ the certification procedures have had the effect of denying 
some foreign products the prestige and potential market power asso- 
ciated with the mark. Furthermore, imports have been excluded 
from carrying an industry stamp of approval. Manufacturers of cer- 
tain recreational equipment were effectively forced out of the Jap- 
anese market when national sports leagues refused to place their 
stamps on foreign-made e q ~ i p m e n t ? ~ ~  Finally, Japanese processes 
which set standards have posed serious problems to Western export- 
e r ~ ? ~ ~  For example, standards have been unavailable in English or 
difficult to obtain;15' they have been changed without notice or with 
insufficient notice given to foreign  manufacturer^;^^^ and the stan- 
dards-formation process has tradititonally been closed to foreign- 
ers.I6I 
The conclusion one can draw from this analysis is that Japanese 
product standards and certification procedures have undeniably 
156 See, for example, the Electrical Appliance and Material Control Law. NO. 
2349 1961- 
157 Foreign manufacturers of products such as aluminum baseball bats, volley- 
balls and tennis balls have been victims of this practice: How the U.S. 
Struck Out I n  Japan, NEW YORK TIMES, 25 Oct. 1981, a t  BI, col. I. But 
see Baseball's Best Trade, BOSTON GLOBE, 22 July 1983, at 30, which reports 
a new agreement between the United States and Japan to permit export of 
metal bats to Japan, reached after extended negotiations of government offi- 
cials from both countries and manufacturers of bats. See supra, note 138, 
a t  152-55. 
I t  is not clear if these barriers can be ascribed to the Japanese government's 
deliberate decisions to exclude foreigners, or if language and distance explain 
the inability of foreign businesses to participate effectively in the process. 
159 See Weil and Glick, supm, note 144, a t  868. The responses to our question- 
naire indicate that this is not a major problem for Canadian manufacturers 
since standards which are not published in English by the Japanese govern- 
ment are usually translated into English by one of the Japanese trading 
companies through which many Canadian companies export to Japan. 
160 Id., a t  870. Domestic industry is often involved in the standards setting 
process, thereby affording domestic manufacturers a temporal advantage 
over foreign firms. For example, an American manufacturer introduced elec- 
tric griddles in Japan in 1974. The following year, a new Japanese standard 
set the temperature a t  two degrees less than the capability of the American 
brand. By the time notice was received and changes made in order for the 
American product to comply, the market had been flooded with two million 
units, most of which were made in Japan. 
161 Recently some Japanese standards-setting bodies have been opened to per- 
mit foreign representation. In  1978 the Japan Electrical Association allowed 
American representatives to sit on its standards formulation and revision 
committees. See MITI  (Overseas Public Relations Office), ILIPLEMENTA- 
TION OF THE IMPROVEMENT IN JAPAN'S STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION 
S ~ s ~ ~ n r s  (13 Feb. 1984) ; MITI, STANDARDS INFORMATION NO. 4 (15 Feb. 
19841, a t  1, 4. 
Heinonline - -  19 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 350 1985 
I g85 JAPANESE PRODUCT SAFETY 35' 
operated as barriers to trade. Moreover, unlike quotas and explicit 
tariffs, non-tariff barriers may not be foreseeable, thus introducing 
uncertainty into the intemational trade environment which is a ma- 
jor concern of exportersle2 In addition, compliance costs entail ex- 
pensive design and production technique modifications. This capital 
investment would have had to have been absorbed by the foreign 
manufacturer in cases where the domestic Japanese market was rela- 
tively competitive. Where these non-tariff costs were significant, the 
market was effectively closed to the foreign exporter. Where uncer- 
tainty, increased costs and delays associated with Japanese standards 
were foreseen, a manufacturer may simply have decided that the 
diversion of capital and management resources over an extended 
period would be unjustified. Thus a non-tariff standards barrier may 
operate either as a tariff, increasing the price of imported goods by 
an amount reflecting the costs and risks associated with meeting 
Japanese standards, or as an absolute prohibition of the product 
where the marginal costs associated with exporting to Japan and 
meeting the standards exceed the expected marginal revenues asso- 
ciated with the export market. 
In an attempt to reduce some of these standards baniers, Western 
businesses and governments have demanded, in the context of bilat- 
eral and multilateral negotiations with the Japanese, that market- 
opening reforms be implemented. In response, a series of trade lib- 
eralization measures have been announced by the Japanese which 
are designed to reduce the trade baniers to varying degrees depend- 
ing upon the industry in question. 
In January of 1980, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (usually referred to as the GATT Standards Code)? to 
which both Canada and Japan are signatories, came into effect. The 
primary object of the Code is to reduce the number of unnecessary 
standards obstacles to international trade. At the same time, the 
Code recognizes domestic sovereignty of each nation to enact legiti- 
mate measures "necessary. . . for the protection of human, animal 
or plant life or health or the The Code encourages 
162 Supra, note 146, at 38:5. 
163 Supra, note 130. See R. Middleton, The GATT Standards Code (1980) 14 
J. WORLD TRADE LAW 201 ; Sweeney, supra, note 29. 
164 Standards Code, supra, note 130 at art. 2.2. 
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the use of international standards,165 the promulgation of perfor- 
mance rather than design standards,166 the provision of notice and 
comment to foreign enterprises in standards setting processes (trans- 
parency provisions) 7 the acceptability of foreign test data,'=' and 
access to certification systems.lW While the traditional standards 
structure in Japan is frequently criticized as being in contravention 
of Japan's GATT obligations, it is fair to say that the Standards 
Code has been relied upon by the West to only a limited degree to 
influence the Japanese government to reduce its standards barriers. 
The general language in which the exemption of permissible stan- 
dards is couched, and the absence of an effective enforcement ma- 
chinery, have placed in question the obligatory nature of the Code's 
Nevertheless, recent Japanese import promotion measures indi- 
cate that the Japanese government views seriously its responsibilities 
under the Standards Code.171 For example, amendments to the in- 
dustrial standardization law, which provides access to the JIS mark- 
ing system to foreigners, were made in April 1980.'~~ More recently, 
the first general reduction of non-tariff barriers occurred in April 
165 Id., art. 2.2, art. 2.3. 
166 Id., art. 2.4. 
'67 Id., art. 10. 
168 Id., art. 5.2. 
169 Id., art. 7.2. 
1 7 0  A. Blair, Prospects for Implementation of the GATT Standards Agreement 
in the United States (1980) 20 VA. J. INT'L . 699; Bourgeois, supra, note 
136, a t  5. 
Nonetheless, the dispute resolution mechanisms of the Code have proved 
effective in some circumstances. It is simply too early to determine if the 
legislative reforms carried out by the Japanese under the Code will be 
followed by complementary regulatory and administrative reforms. See supra, 
note 138. 
1 7 1  See GATT Chief Both Defends and Chides Japan Amid Trade Friction, 
THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 30 March 1982, at 4. 
172 See REPORT OF THE JAPAN-UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS GROUP, 
supra, note 14,. at  60. The mark is now awarded to foreign products and 
domestic goods without apparent discrimination. In  both cases the criteria 
for the grant of the mark include the inspection and assessment of the quality 
control procedures a t  the factory where the goods are manufactured and the 
maintenance and testing of facilities by an agency authorized by the Min- 
ister. The increased costs of foreign enterprise review continue to be an 
effective barrier. On at  least one occasion, the Americans have argued suc- 
cessfully for the introduction of "self-certification" procedures. See supra, 
note 138, a t  138. 
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and May of 1983T3 and the second occurred in April 1 9 8 4 1 ~ ~  
Under these measures, several legislative and administrative reforms 
have been adopted to support the Code's objectives, including the 
adoption of a system which permits acceptance of certain test data 
outside Japan;175 the direct application for testing in Japan by 
foreign companies;176 simplified approval  procedure^;'^^ approval 
of foreign laboratories for inspection and certification purposes;178 
gradual conformity of many Japanese standards with international 
173 The Law to Amend a Part of the Related Laws to Facilitate the Obtaining 
of Type Approval, etc. by Foreign Manufacturers, 20 April 1983. See Japan 
Closer to Easing Import Curbs, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 25 March 1983, at 
B6, CO~.  5; MITI (Information Office), IMPROVEMENT OF JAPAN'S STAN- 
DARDS AND CERTIFICATION Sysmars (13 May 1983). 
This package of reform measures included the revision of seventeen laws 
to provide for non-discriminatory treatment of foreign manufacturers and 
the introduction of administrative reforms relating to standard drafting pro- 
cesses, internationalization of standards, acceptance of foreign test data and 
simplification of certification procedures. 
174 At the time of writing only a provisional translation of External Economic 
Measures announced by MITI on 27 April 1984 had been published. See 
infra, note 175. (On file, University of British Columbia, Faculty of Law.) 
175 On 15 February 1984, MITI released detailed information describing the 
procedures pursuant to which foreign test data would be accepted by the 
Japanese government. The procedures, which are still complex, permit for- 
eign manufacturers to participate on standards setting committees and per- 
mit certain test data generated by foreign enterprises to be submitted to the 
relevant Japanese authorities. These procedures were further amplified in 
MITI (Standards Information Centre), Standards Information No. 5 (26 
April 1984) which set out the specific laws for which foreign test data will 
be accepted and the guidelines for designation of foreign certification lab- 
oratories. 
These measures were part of a broader program of tariff and non-tariff 
reduction measures announced by the Japanese government. See H. Okonogi 
(MITI), JAPAN EXTERNAL ECONOMIC MEASURES (27 April I 984). On I I 
June 1984 Applied Research Laboratories in the United States was named a 
Designated Foreign Inspection Body under Japan's Electrical Appliances 
and Material Control Law. See MITI, STANDARDS INFORDIA~ON NO. 9: 
U.S. TESTING INSTITUTION NAMED '~ESIGNATED FOREIGN INSPECTION 
BODY" UNDER JAPAN'S ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES AND MATERWLS CONTROL 
LAW ( I I June I 984). 
176 MITI, STANDARDS INFORMATION NO. 7: REGISTRATION F DIMPLEX HEAT- 
ING LTD. OF GREAT BRITAIN BY DIRECT ACCESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES AND MATERIAL CONTROL AW (26 April 1984); 
MITI, STANDARDS INFORMATION NO. I I : REGISTRATION OF S.A. SEB. OF 
FRANCE BY DIRECT ACCESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSUMER PRODUCT 
SAFETY LAW (I9 July 1984). 
177 The inspection procedure for subsequent similar shipments of a product has 
been streamlined considerably, thereby cutting costly delays. 
178  MITI, STANDARDS INFORMATION NO. 12 : UL WAS APPROVED AS A FOREIGN 
INSPECTION B DY UNDER THREE JAPANESE LAWS BY MITI (14 Aug. 1984) ; 
MITI, STANDARDS INFORMATION NO. 8: APPROVAL OF A FOREIGN INSPEC- 
TION INSTITUTE UND R JIS LAW - THE SINGAPORE INSTITUTE OF STAN- 
DARDS OF INDUSTRIAL ESEARCH (SISIR) WAS APPROVED AS AN "APPROVED 
INSPECTION INSTITUTE" (2 May I 984). 
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standards;17' the implementation of an after-permit examination 
customs system;lsO the introduction of a centralized customs classifi- 
cation system; and the opening of standards drafting committees to 
foreigners.''' In a measure specific to Canada-Japan trade, the Ca- 
nadian Standards Association in 1981 reached an agreement with 
the Japan Electrical Testing Laboratory pursuant to which certain 
Canadian products can be tested and certified in Canada to have 
met Japanese standards. The Japanese Electrical Testing Laboratory 
will utilize the certificate along with the test report issued by the 
Canadian Standards Association to simplify its testing practice in 
accordance with the Rules of Utilization of Test Data by Foreign 
Testing Bodies approved by the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry.lS2 
In addition, the Japanese government has reduced tariffs on over 
1700 mined and manufactured products a full year in advance of 
the schedule agreed upon at the MTN Tokyo Round.- Tariffs on 
agricultural, forestry and marine products are also to be reduced in 
1985, one year earlier than scheduled. These reductions are to take 
effect "providing that other leading nations do the same in imple- 
menting their own advanced reductions.'y1w What remains to be 
seen is whether these tariff and non-tariff liberalization measures 
179  Where international standards exist, as in the case of International Electro- 
technical Commission (IEC) standards, International Commission on Rules 
for Approval of Electrical Equipment (CEE) standards, International Stan- 
dard Organization (ISO) standards or FAO/WHO Committee Evaluations 
of Food Additives, the government has committed itself to attempt confor- 
mity. Where no such standards exist the government will participate in 
international standards-setting bodies. There has already been considerable 
relaxation of Japanese automobile standards in order to conform with E.E.C. 
and North American standards. See Transport Ministry to Publicize Sim- 
plified Car Import Procedures - The Japanese Market is Open to Foreign 
Autos, THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 14 Feb. 1984, at  10. See also MITI, 
STANDARDS INFORMATION NO. 6: JAPAN JOINS THE CERTIFICATION SYSTEBI 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COBIMISSION FOR CONFORMI'IY CERTIFICATION (27 
April I 984). 
180 This system allows examination of documents for the purposes of duty as- 
sessment to be made after the goods are released from customs custody. 
181 Supra, note 16 I .  See also MITI, STANDARDS INFORAIA~ON NO. 10: 1984 
FISCAL YEAR PLAN FOR PREPARATION OF NEW AND REVISED DRAFTS OF 
JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS (JIS) (27 June 1984). In  addition, the 
comment period for such government bodies has been extended from 45 to 
72 days. 
182 Supra, note 10, at  20. 
183 Supra, note I 74. 
18.4 Id. 
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will result in a truly open Japanese market, or indeed whether addi- 
tional non-tariff barriers will appear to take their places?s5 
On balance it appears that a Canadian manufacturer dealing 
with the Japanese market today is less likely to encounter the stan- 
dards barriers he would have confronted a decade ago. Nevertheless, 
standards will continue to operate as non-tar3 barriers as long as 
disparities exist, and international harmonization of all technical 
standards is an unrealistic aspiration as long as nations react to 
divergent domestic, economic, cultural, social and political influ- 
ences. In  the next section we attempt to articulate these influences 
on product safety regulation in Japan, and suggest how they might 
affect decisions to adopt Western standards and products liabiity 
law. 
V. JAPANESE PRODUCT SAFETY REGULATION AND 
THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN IDEOLOGY 
The high profile character of Western-Japanese trade relations 
and our often inexplicable and surprising ign~rance"~ of the Japan- 
ese makes any treatment of "the" Japanese national character sus- 
ceptible to the pitfak of oversimplification and stereotyping. Mutual 
misunderstandings are perhaps inevitable despite improved commu- 
nication between the two cultures in this century.ls7 In addition, an 
analysis of Japanese attitudes involves the danger of overemphasiz- 
ing traditional Japanese culture and society while ignoring the 
changes which have transpired since the Second World War. To 
ignore the partial Westernization of traditional Japanese attitudes 
185 Some recent comments in the Western press have been decidedly negative: 
P. Agress, U.S. Calls on Japan to Eliminate Import Barriers, BUSINESS 
A a r s ~ c ~ ,  22 March 1982, a t  4; U.S. Trade Deficit Cited in Friction with 
Japan, THE GLOBE AND h, 20 Sept. 1984, a t  B6, col. 5. 
186 Western businessmen appear to be less willing to incur substantial expen- 
ditures on research of the Japanese market. In contrast to their Western 
counterparts Japanese exporters thoroughly familiarize themselves with their 
export markets. This is perhaps due to the pre-eminence of English as the 
international language of commerce, and of Western business practices as the 
method of transacting. 
This factor may, however, be undergoing significant changes. See J. 
Shinn, A New Wave of 'Japan-inn', Parts I and I1 in THE JAPAN ECONOMIC 
JOURNAL, 20 and 27 Oct. 1981, a t  24. See also Abbott and Totman, supra, 
note 12, at  147-50. 
YJ7 E. Wilkinson, MISUNDERSTANDING, EUROPE VERSUS JAPAN ( 1982)~ at  13. 
The very existence of labels such as 'Japan, Inc.' and 'the Japanese economic 
animal' testify to the stereotyped perceptions many Westerners have of the 
Japanese. Id., a t  75. 
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and habits is to commit a grave sociological error.lS8 We must em- 
phasize that our purpose is not to present a comprehensive character- 
ization of Japanese culture, but rather to abstract several relevant 
cultural attributes which may assist us to understand present Japan- 
ese policies toward products safety regulation. It is our thesis that 
these policies can be explained : first, by the Japanese aversion to risk- 
taking, and the related preference for certainty and harmony; sec- 
ond, by their attitude towards foreigners; and third, by the absence 
of an effective products liability litigation system.189 Before identify- 
ing the consequences of these social characteristics, we wish to eluci- 
date briefly the historical, cultural and physical forces that make 
these characteristic of Japanese society. 
The Japanese cultural tradition stresses the priority of the "rela- 
tionship", and thus the interests of the group over the interests of 
the individual. It has its roots in lingering feudalistic values,l"O the 
religious and cultural homogeneity of Japan's inhabitants,''' and 
the teachings of C o n f u c i ~ s . ~ ~ ~  For the Japanese, the identity of the 
individual is submerged in the larger group, whether it be family, 
company, village or nation, and is constrained by the mutual obliga- 
tions and duties owed to others and the group (on), as well as by a 
set of rules of conduct known as gi~i."~ The pursuit of individual 
goals is considered to be detrimental to the harmony of the group 
(wa), in which there is a strict hierarchy imposing on the occupier 
Id., a t  89-159. 
189 The relevance of culture to explain Japanese economic success has been 
noted by others. See K. Yamamura, supra, note 22, at 130. At least some 
part of the regulatory framework within which Japan business operates must 
be seen as "products of Japanese culture - to be recognized as such and seen 
as inherent assets of Japanese society . . .". Id., a t  13 I. 
190 The feudal regime was legally terminated only in the latter part of the last 
century. R. Benedict, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD (1946). Jap- 
anese feudalism was a t  its peak in the sixteenth century, but even prior to 
that time clan-like social organization appears to have been a common 
feature of Japanese society. See generally R. Cole, JAPANESE BLUE COLLAR 
(1971 ) ; H. Wren, The Legal System of Pre-Western Japan (1968) 20 
HAST. L.J. 2 17. 
191 Y. Noda, The Far Eastern Conception of Law (1971) 2 INT'L ENCYCLO- 
PEDIA COMP. L. 120, a t  129. 
192 Confucianism stresses obedience to a hierarchial system and the importance 
of mutual personal obligations. Kim and Lawson, supra, note 48, a t  494. 
193 Giri (gi: just or right; ri: reason or reasonable behaviour) means the man- 
ner of behaviour required of one person toward others in consequence of his 
social status: Y. Noda, INTRODUC~ON TO JAPANESE LAW ( I  976), a t  175. 
For a detailed discussion of the Japanese system of obligations see Benedict, 
supra, note 190, Ch. 6-7; Gibney, supra, note 20, Ch. 6. 
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of each position a range of specific responsibilities, duties and rules 
of conduct. 
This collective consciousness has deep historical, religious and 
cultural roots. Centuries of relative isolation have produced a homo- 
geneity which has had a significant socially cohesive Japan- 
ese religion combines elements of Confucianism, Hinduism, and 
Buddhism with Shintoism, and is responsible in part for encouraging 
this group mentality. Confucianism, for example, emphasizes adher- 
ence to the accepted social order at the expense of individual ac- 
tion.lg5 When Buddhism was adopted in Japan it had to be altered 
so that it would not conflict with the Japanese social rank system, 
for one of its tenets was the obliteration of social diitinctions.lg6 As 
the state religion, Shintoism was often invoked to cultivate national 
unity. One author has coined the term 'Japanesism' to describe the 
effect religion has had on social conduct? referring to a group 
cohesion with strong religious overtones, and to an emphasis on 
ceremony and ritual. 
A central element of Japanese group consciousness is the family 
relationship. Within the family there is a household head and an 
established hierarchical ranking which determines the rights, priv- 
ileges, and pattern of daily life of each family member. Associated 
with a rank are duties and responsibilities to subordinates, since the 
holder of a superior position in the group is, in Ruth Benedict's 
words, a trustee, not an autocrat.lg8 This structure nurtures in the 
Japanese a need for dependence (amae) on a superior,*9 and an 
expectation that a person's stability and needs are the responsibility 
of his senior. This atmosphere, where the achievement of individual 
needs and ambitions is discouraged, and dependence on others for 
security is encouraged, reflects a culture which places a high value 
on certainty, and which may be described as averse to risk-taking 
and conflict. Thus one may be able to articulate a cultural bias in 
1% Wren, supra, note 190, at 221; T. Ka\vashiia, The Status of the Individual 
in the Notion of Law, Right and Social Order in Japan, in THE JAPANESE 
MIND: ESSENTIALS OF JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE (Moore ed. 
1 9 6 7 ) ~  at 262. 
195 Kim and Lawson, supra, note 48, at 496. 
1% Gibney, supra, note 20, at 106. 
197 I. Dasan (Y. Shichhei), JAPANESE AND THE JEWS (1970); Wren, supra, 
note 190, at 223. 
198 Benedict, supra, note 190, at 54. 
199 T. Doi, THE ANATOMY OF DEPENDENCE (1973). Gibney, supra, note 20, 
Ch. 6. 
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favour of 'certainty' and avoidance of risk which is reflected in the 
psychological discomfort which the Japanese experience when the 
hierarchical social ranking is not e~ tab l i shed .~~  
The family-group concept pervades many aspects of Japanese 
society because of its consistency (in different contexts) of attitudes, 
expectations and values. At the workplace the collective interest is 
equally pervasive.'O1 The lifetime tenure system, while not as per- 
vasive as some believe, still applies to a significant portion of the 
workforce. Together with its associated benefitsZoZ it provides sig- 
nificant financial and social security for labour which may be un- 
available in an individualistic, mobile labour market. Individual 
goals are identified with, and perhaps subsumed by, company objec- 
tives, and social and psychological security is provided in the work 
group. Thus the company is often referred to as uchi (my house) .'03 
The relatively stable employment structure of Japanese industry is 
consistent with the view of a culture which emphasizes certainty 
and stability in relationships among its members. Risk aversion has 
been found, in some cultures, to correlate directly with unwillingness 
to experience job rotation, and with resistance to changes in job 
activities.'04 
The concept of the hierarchical family relationship as a social 
ideal can be extended to the level of the national government, giving 
it a paternalistic role in the regulation of its citizensy behavio~r.~O~ 
Paternalism may be more readily justified if one accepts that indi- 
vidual choice exercised through contract risk allocation may entail 
substantial transaction and error costs, and that social responsibility 
for victims of accidents justifies limited interference with individual 
liberty. Although the co-operative nature of the government-business 
200 Nakane, supra, note 2 I,  a t  26-3 I. 
~ 0 1  For recent statistical information compiled in a survey entitled Compariton 
of Office Environment in Japan and the U.S., see Japanese Prefer Working 
in Big Rooms with Others to Lone Offices, THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 
I I May 1982, a t  5. See also Yamamura, supra, note 22, a t  133. 
202 These include automatic pay raises, housing, welfare and fringe benefits, 
day care facilities and organized social events. R. Dore, BRITISH FACTORY 
JAPANESE FACTORY (1973) ; F. Gibney, MIRACLE BY DESIGN (1982), at  
55-72. Extended job security and associated benefits are enjoyed by an 
estimated 25% of the workforce. 
203 Nakane, supra, note 21, at 3. A von Mehren, Some Reflections on Japanese 
Law (1958) 71 HARV. L. REV. 1486. 
204 4. R. Greene, RISK AVERSION, INSURANCE AND THE FUTURE (1971). 
205 J. Strayer, The Tokugawa Period and Japanese Feudalism, in STUDIES IN 
THE INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF EARLY MODERN JAPAN ( I  968), a t  3, 8. 
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relationship is perhaps better kno~vn to Western c~rnmentatoc?~~ 
the relationship between the individual and government is equally 
noteworthy. Just as  the Japanese individual in feudal society ex- 
changed loyalty for protection from a lord, today he seeks similar 
economic and social security from the state.'07 This national charac- 
teristic has been noted in corporate as well as private contexts. 
Benjamin Rowland has analyzed Japanese corporate behaviour and 
concludes that "the key to Japan's economic and financial system 
. . . has been the premise that the state will serve as the risktaker of 
last res0r t~~;2~~ Product safety regulation which emphasizes govern- 
ment intervention ex ante, and which thus limits individual choice 
in favour of insurance and rislr reduction, is consistent with thii 
description of Japanese society. 
Associated with paternalistic values which discourage individual- 
ism, the structured relationships of the group system provide its 
members with security. That is, Japanese society is one in which it 
is not generally accepted for the individual to make decisions with- 
out regard for the group and, in fact, is one where people are ill at 
ease with such decisions because of their dependence for security 
on the group and its accepted modes of conduct?09 In the context 
of product safety regulation, these cultural attitudes would logically 
lead to an emphasis on state and mandatory private products liabil- 
ity insurance programs, and on state programs which establish spe- 
cified levels of product safety risk and which reduce the levels of risk 
to a minimum level, taking into account social attitudes of depen- 
dency. These general cultural attitudes can be analyzed in two con- 
texts. The first is the Japanese preference for domestic products, 
which has been recognized as an important "third level" non-tariff 
208 See Narita, supra, note 18; Yamanouchi, Administrative Guidance and the 
Rule of Law (1974) ro LAW IN JAPAN 22; Johnson, The Japanese Legal 
Milieu and its Relationship to Business (1976) 13 Aar. Bus. L.J. 340, at 346. 
207 In a statement released on 21 December 1982 by Keidanren (Japan Fed- 
eration of Economic Organizations) on trade-related regulatory administra- 
tion, it was recommended that this type of thinking be abandoned. The 
Japanese tendency to look to the government to intervene to protect its 
citizens should cease, it was suggested, and instead Japanese citizens should 
stand on their ovrn feet. K K C  Brief, No. 3, Jan. 1983. 
-a B. Rowland, Japanese Corporate Behaviour: An Outside View, in U.S.- 
JAPANESE CONOMIC RELATIONS: 'COOPERATION, COMPETITION, AND CON- 
FRONTATION (D. Tasca ed. 1 9 8 0 ) ~  at 83, 84. 
209 D. Haring, Japanese National Character: Cultural Anthropology, Psycho- 
analysis, and History (1953) 42 YALE REV. 375. 
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barrier.210 The second js Japanese enterprises' approach to product 
quality and safety decisions. 
The strong Japanese identification with the group combined with 
a sense of national insularity and vulnerability results in a 'them-us' 
syndrome, which at a national level translates into a desire to keep 
foreigners at a distance. This, of course, has been recognized as an 
important subordinate factor in the non-tariff trade banier sector.211 
For centuries the Tokugawa regime neither permitted Japanese citi- 
zens to travel abroad nor allowed foreigners to enter Japan. Japan 
had to be forced into opening its doors to the West in the late 
nineteenth century and treaties clearly adverse to Japanese interests 
were imposed upon it.2" The country was deprived initially of its 
customs autonomy and found itself unable to protect its domestic 
industry from a flood of foreign imports. Japan was unable to revise 
these treaties until it adopted a legal system acceptable to the 
For geographical reasons Japan has relied almost exclusively on 
imports for a considerable percentage of its resource materials, food 
and oil?l4 which places the nation in a position of substantial eco- 
nomic dependence on multi-national corporate enterprise and for- 
eign governments. The willingness with which governments use trade 
sanctions for political or economic reasons has at times left Japan in 
an extremely vulnerable position, and may have fostered a justifi- 
able fear that inadequate supply and service is a risk of dealing with 
a foreign supplier.215 Reliance on foreign resources gave rise to the 
generally held view that the Japanese were working at a dangerous 
level of dependence on imports.216 As a result many Japanese view 
imports as inherently undesirable, and until recently have been re- 
210 TASK FORCE REPORT (1g80), supra, note 7. See Abbott and Totman, supra, 
note 12, at  133-34. 
211 Abbott and Totman, id. 
212 Id., at 140. 
2'3 Henderson, supra, note 46, at  577. 
"4 In any given year Japan imports 99.8% of its oil, 88.7% of its natural gas 
and 79.2% of its coal. Economic and Foreign Affairs Research Association, 
UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOK OF WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS; STATISTICAL 
SURVEY OF JAPAN'S ECONOMY (1981 ), at 29. See also The Man from 
MITI  Speaks His Mind, FORTUNE, 4 Oct. 1982, Vo1. 106, NO. 7, at  gz. 
215 See N. Akao, JAPAN'S ECONOMIC SECURITY: RESOURCES AS A FACTOR IN 
FOREIGN POLICY (1983); R. Morse, THE POLITICS OF JAPAN'S ENERGY 
STRATEGY: RESOURCES-DIPLOMACY-SECURITY ( I 98 I ) . 
216 J. Hirschmeier, T. Yui, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE BUSINESS 1600- 
1980 (1981), a t  242-43. 
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luctant to lift protectionist trade barriers and thereby encourage 
increased foreign dependence.217 An emphasis on the quality stan- 
dards of foreign products may derive from a concern about leaving 
product quality in the hands of foreign companies, which may be 
accustomed to trading off (to a greater extent than would the Jap- 
anese) product safety or quality for lower production costs.21s These 
risks may not be subject to ex post litigation controls and, most im- 
portant, will not be subject to the internalized constraints on be- 
haviour which the Japanese enterprise may reflect. This is not to say 
that all of Japan's actions in this regard have been justifiable, but 
taking Japanese attitudes into account makes Japan's international 
trade position more comprehensible to an outsider. 
Cultural attitudes to~vards risk and conflict reflected in attitudes 
to~vards foreign goods may be reflected as well in the behaviour of 
Japanese manufacturers to\vards product standards and quality con- 
trol, which are significantly different than those adhered to by many 
manufacturers in the West.219 Although the term 'zero defects' orig- 
inated in America, it has been the Japanese who have chosen to take 
it seriously. Wherever feasible, the Japanese endeavour to inspect 
each product for flaws or defects before it enters the market. They 
may be willing to concede that 'perfection' is an unrealistic goal, 
but that does not prevent them from striving to attain it. The de- 
tailed design specifications and rigorous certification procedures 
complained of by Western business enterprises may reflect a concern 
with detail which has been described as a generalized Japanese 
cultural characteristic. Production of complex consumer goods "ne- 
cessitates adherence to performance standards in each part, which 
reflects each employee's wdlingnes to pay close attention to detail 
and his desire to assure the quality of the produ~t' ' .2~ As Cleaver 
" 7  This attitude towards foreign products is also apparent in the case of foreign 
capital. See R. S. Ozaki, THE CONTROL OF I~EPORTS AND FOREIGN CAPITAL 
IN JAPAN (1972)~ a t  124-26. 
218 An example of one response by the Japanese is a private import agreement 
pursuant to which the Japanese buyer establishes both the raw materials 
and production formula for the product which it intends to import. See 
THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 6 Sept. 1983, at  14. I t  has been re- 
ported that the Japanese hold the belief "that the American cars, in general, 
are of inferior quality". R. Roy and A. Rassuli, International Trade Barriers 
and the United States Automobile Industry (1983) 14 TOL. L. REV. 263, at  
277. 
R. Schonberger, JAPANESE MANUFACTURING TECHNIQUES (1982)~ a t  61; 
S. Kikuchi, Japanese Quality Control Method Increasingly Finds its Way 
Abroad, THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, I June 1982, at  I I. 
220 Yamamura, supra, note 22, a t  137. 
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has put it, employee attitudes may reflect "pride in the manufacture 
Y' 221 of a good product . 
I n  contrast, few Western manufacturers even attempt one hun- 
dred per cent inspection, but instead choose to apply random sam- 
pling methods of products quality Rather than incurring 
the additional immediate production costs associated with stringent 
quality control, many Western manufacturers are willing to accept 
the fact that there will always be a certain percentage of defective 
products entering the market.223 
The Japanese believe that quality is good and better quality is there- 
fore better than lesser quality. They will go beyond any sort of ra- 
tional trade-off to achieve this. For example, if you analyze the 
percentage defects in a process and the costs of making that per- 
centage less, you will very often find that it makes sense to go from 
five percent defects to one percent defects. If you then ask whether 
it makes sense to go from one percent defects to I / 10 of a percent 
defects, the economists will generally say, "No, that does not make 
sense." And the American firm will not, therefore, take that step. 
The Japanese firm will. If you say to them, "That's silly. I t  makes 
no economic sense," they will answer, "We don't care. Better quality 
is better than poorer quality." Once they get to I / I O  of one percent, 
they will go to I 1100 or I / I ooo of one percent. Then they will look 
at you with a disarming smile and say, "That's what makes us such 
fierce competitors. You may be satisfied with one percent defects, 
but we are not." 
In  situations where one hundred per cent inspection is impractical 
the Japanese have rejected the random sample method and have 
selected alternative methods such as checking the first and last part 
manufactured in every.lot. The rationale is that if the first part was 
manufactured correctly the machine was working properly at the 
outset, and if the last part is also flawless, then the process remained 
stable throughout and all the parts in the lot are satisfactory. 
The results of such quality control speak for themselves. The 
Japanese ratio of defective auto part products is usually 0.1-0.276 
221 C. G. Cleaver, JAPANESE AND AMERICANS : CULTURAL PARALLELS AND PAR- 
ADOXES (1976)' at 104. 
222 Schonberger, supra, note 219, at 70. 
223 Robert H. Hayes of the Harvard Business School quoted by Gibney, supra, 
note 202, at 158. The quotation is taken from an interview in the film 
People and Productivity: Learning from Japan, which was planned and 
edited by Maurice B. Mitchell and Frank Gibney at the Pacific Basin Insti- 
tute and produced by C. Olin for the Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational 
Corporation. 
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compared to a North American ratio of I .0 -2 .0%.~~~ Standards re- 
flect similar attitudes. In the case of imported agricultural products, 
the Japanese had established a "zero tolerance" level for prohibited 
insects. Canadian export certificates, however, often identXed the 
product as "substantially free" from the insect and thus Canadian 
products would be denied entry.225 The point is that product safety 
regulation in Canada either explicitly or implicitly accepts that risks 
to health, safety and lives can be evaluated in monetary terms and 
that "acceptable levels" of risk must be established. On occasion the 
Japanese must also do this, but they do not admit it so easily. 
Allocation of risk of personal injury in exchange for compensating 
payments in the form of price reductions may assume positive atti- 
tudes to\vards consumer sovereignty, an assumption which may be 
less justifiable in the case of Japan than in some Western societies. 
The Japanese may very well be willing to forego the welfare gains 
associated with contract risk allocation in exchange for minimum 
safety standards for a wide variety of consumer goods. Homogeneity 
of attitudes towards risk may reinforce the view that a 'standard 
formy multilateral contract with relatively rigorous safety standards 
is desirable. Social welfare may be maximized by conscious directed 
decisions regarding product safety rather than by atomistic market 
decisions.226 In dealing with risks to health and safety, decisions to 
use market allocative devices, coupled with compensation through 
litigation, assume a positive answer to the question "Do individuals 
want to make the necessary and appropriate value judgments?" In a 
society which is highly structured it may be that consumers would 
prefer that experts replace them in that decision process. The bene- 
fits of certainty, the avoidance of risk, and distributional considera- 
tions may be associated with the view that "freedom from risk of 
22.1 A. Kubota, Selling Canadian Auto Parts to Japan ( I )  -Indications are 
Strong Japanese Will Rather Invest in Canada, THE JAPAN ECONOMIC 
JOURNAL, 29 Sept. 1981, at 24. 
225 MARKETS FOR CANADIAN EXPORTERS, supra, note 37, a t  26. 
226 Ozaki, supra, note 2 I 7, at 56. Studies on Japanese managers, employees and 
investors are now frequently reported and published in the Western academic 
press. Consumer behaviour has not been as widely analyzed, but i t  has been 
noted that the behaviour, rather than being characterized by risk-taking, is 
hierarchical, and that tastes are characterized by "generally accepted levels". 
See Gibney, supra, note 20, a t  186-89. 
Thus the phenomenon of expressed consumer demand for a variety of 
goods, perhaps artificially distinguished from one another, and similar emu- 
lations of Western consumer behaviour and living styles were not generally 
perceived as characteristics of the Japanese consumer until the early 1970s. 
See D. Henderson, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN (1983)~ a t  77; G. Allen, 
JAPAN'S ECONOBIIC POLICY ( I  9 8 0 ) ~  a t  I 62-63. 
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injury" is a merit good which ought to be allocated paternaistically 
rather than through the market.227 
Freedom is an ambiguous concept, carrying with it a price of 
un~ertainty.~'~ Japanese society and culture emphasize the relative 
status of specific groups and individuals, reducing the degree of un- 
certainty associated with one's role. The 'paternal' authority re- 
flected in strict regulation of quality and product safety control, 
which a substantial portion of the population assumes to be self- 
evident, encourages a high degree of certainty in a long-run sense.pg 
This socialization of risk may represent a decision on the part of the 
Japanese government that the benefits associated with individual 
autonomy can be sacrificed for different social objectives. In con- 
trast, in some Western countries in which ideological values em- 
phasize individual autonomy, social policy demands that manufac- 
turers in most situations be free to produce goods associated with a 
higher degree of risk of personal injury, provided the consumer is 
furnished with the necessary information and warnings to permit an 
informed decision.230 The view that personal injury risks are volun- 
tarily assumed (at a price) is inconsistent with the Japanese philos- 
ophy that disputes are unnatural? that contracts and risk alloca- 
tion are secondary to the natural spirit of friendship and good will? 
and that the relationship of merchant and client is one of status, 
with the client as the 
Equally important to this analysis is an appreciation of product 
safety regulation as a multi-institutional regulatory process. Product 
design, safety risks and accident compensation objectives are influ- 
enced both by a priori replatory standards, and prospectively and 
retrospectively by civil products liability claims. As described earlier, 
the Japanese, for whatever reasons, have not adopted formal litiga- 
tion of disputes with deterrent or cost-internalization objectives. A 
call for relaxation of standards regulation in accordance with West- 
ern social ideals ignores the fact that the complementary alternative 
227 See G. Mooney, Human Life and Suflering in THE VALUATION OF SOCIAL 
COST (D. Pearce ed. 1978), 120, at 125. 
22s E. Fromm, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM ( 1941 ), Ch. 2. 
229 A. Lauterbach, Social Factors in Business Uncertainty, in EXPECTATIONS, 
UNCERTAINTY AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR (M. J. Bowman ed. I 958). 
B0 R. Hirshhorn, Regulating Quality in Product Markets in THE REGULATION 
OF QUALITY (D. Dewees ed. 1983), 55, at 72-76. 
See text accompanying notes 47-52. 
232 Gibney, supra, note 20, at I 18-23. 
233 Kim and Lawson, supra, note 48, at 5 I o- 
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product safety regime (i.e., products liabiiilty law) has evolved quite 
differently in Japan, where it may represent a more advanced stage 
of evolution. Reform of the Japanese standards system would thus 
seem to demand from the Japanese a reconsideration and reformu- 
lation of the civil liabiity of manufacturers for product-related 
injuries. This is not to say that the dual task is necessarily either 
impossible or undesirable. It simply points out that product safety 
regulation involves two institutions, and that reform of the regula- 
tory process in Japan is likely to be difficult, time-consuming and 
particularly disruptive to existing legal and social norms in Japan 
for a number of reasons. 
First, regulatory control of product quality and safety is reinforced 
by the magnitude and nature of bureaucratic power in Japan. Gov- 
ernment standards regulation reflects an informal consensus of all 
interested participants rather than a pure command model of state 
interference with business enterprise. The co-operative structure of 
government-business relations a s  well as the interchange of person- 
nel between the two communities suggest that regulatory supervision 
in Japan does not mimic that of the West. Activities including stan- 
dard setting may be generated by co-operative decisions of private 
industry and the state.%* Thus, obligatory internationalization of 
regulatory measures established through Western regulatory pro- 
cesses, if they differ from the co-operative processes of the Japanese, 
may work to the disadvantage of the J a p a n e ~ e . ~ ~  
Second, the emphasis of the Japanese on regulatory control of 
product safety may reflect an acknowledgement that corporate 
decision-making which takes place through collective action by 
groups of managers diffuses accountability and responsibility, and 
justifies risk-taking behaviour by business enterprise which would 
not be undertaken by individuals.236 
Third, the Japanese may believe that investments in quality and 
safety regulation represent a form of accident insurance which will 
K. M o c h i i ,  Government-Business Relations in Japan and the United 
States: A Study in Contrasts, in U.S.-JAPANESE CONOMIC RELATIONS, CO- 
OPERATION, CO~~~PETITION AND CONFRONTATION, supra, note 208, a t  86-88. 
235 Japan Culture Institute, The Bureaucracy: Japan's Pool of Leadership, in 
POLITICS AND ECONO~~ICS I N  CONTEMPORARY JAPAN, Supra, note 22, a t  81, 
85; N. Nobuyoshi, "Japan, Inc.": Reality or Facade?. Id., a t  I 17. 
236 R. Clark, THE JAPANESE COMPANY (1g7g), at 126-27. Dore, supra, note 
202, a t  227-28. Thii diiusion of responsibility, and thus the propensity for 
greater corporate risk-taking than would be engaged in by individuals, sug- 
gests that ex-post compensation will prove to be  an unsatisfactory product 
safety regulatory program. See Hirschmeier and Yui, supra, note 216, a t  
254. 
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not be carried out through atomistic market transactions. In the case 
of personal injury losses, individuals consiitently under-insure either 
because they underestimate the probability of the accident occur- 
ring,237 or because they fail to take into account external costs. 
Fourth, Japanese seem to understand, in a way that we are just 
now recognizing, that "as far as the sociology of law is concerned" 
corporate power is such that products liability law is not an effective 
means of The attitudes and behaviour of Japanese con- 
sumer gro~ps,23~ the administrative costs of organizing litigation, 
and the corporate control of technical expertise all combine to limit 
the effectiveness of litigation as a corporate control technique. 
Fifth, in adopting a balance between civil products liability rules 
and direct product safety regulation, the Japanese have acknowl- 
edged that the products liability system of safety regulation, while 
it may bring reduced administrative costs, is ineffective where the 
manufacturer does "not face the threat of suit for harm done".240 
This risk of externalization of costs is magnified in the case of for- 
eign manufacturers, where there are substantial structural barriers to 
litigation, and where social attitudes provide exogenous disincen- 
tives to litigation. 
Finally, the recent experience of the Japanese faced with cata- 
strophic products liability injuries has inevitably contributed not only 
to the promulgation of more rigorous product standards, but also to 
the reluctance of the Japanese government to remove any of the 
existing standards. As described previously, the Japanese have ex- 
perienced serious and widespread injuries resulting from the activi- 
ties of foreign manufacturers. The four pollution the tha- 
237 H. Kunreuther, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LES- 
SONS (1978), a t  I 13-15. 
238 Otake, supra, note 84, a t  76, 86. 
239 While organized consumer movements do exist, their roles have been gen- 
erally limited to education and information initiatives. Reich, supra, note 59. 
240 See S. Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety (1984) I3 
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 357, at  363. 
241 ( I )  The Itai-itai disease in Toyama (Komatsu et al. v. Mitsui Kimuku, 
Toyama District Court, 22 KAKYU MINSRU (NOS. 5-6) Besatsu I, 30 June 
1971; Aoyama et al. v.  Mitsui Kintoku, Kanazawa Branch of Nagoya High 
Court, 674 HANREI JIHO 25, g Aug. 1972). (2) Minamata disease in Niigata 
(Ono et al. v.  Showa Denko, Niigata District Court, 22 KAKYU MINSHU 
(Nos. 9-10) 29 Sept. 1971). (3) Asthma a t  Yokkaichi (Shiono et al. v. 
Showa Yokkaichi Sekiyu et al., Yokkaichi Branch of Tsu District Court, 
672 HANREI JIHO 30, 24 July 1g72), and (4) Minamata disease in Kuma- 
mot0 (Watanabe et al. v. Chisso, Kumamoto District Court, 696 HANREI 
JIHO 15, 20 March 1973). 
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lidomide ca~e,2~' the Boeing case243 and more recently the Chloro- 
quine cases,- among others, have made injuries from defective 
products a sensitive issue for the Japanese government. While some 
judicial developments to aid plaintiffs in products liability suits re- 
sulted from these cases,245 regulatory action has been taken to ensure 
not simply that injured parties are more likely to be compensated 
but, more important, that the injuries do not occur in the first 
place.- 
The present reluctance of the Japanese government to bring its 
standards into complete accord with international standards is 
clearly and succinctly summarized in a recent MITI publication 
which states:'*' 
The United States has been requesting that the Japanese Govern- 
ment allow U.S. manufacturers to self-certify compliance with Jap- 
anese standards on safety, etc. This suggests that we should adopt 
the approach of dealing with accidents, etc., after the fact, i.e., 
through recall of cars from the market, civil judicial procedures, 
etc. However, Japan's system on automobile accidents, pollutions, 
etc. has long been predicated on the idea that they should be pre- 
vented before the fact. . . . 
It is difficult to prove any direct connection between product 
safety regulation and Japanese legal ideology as we have character- 
ized it. Nonetheless we do think that several points can be made. 
242 Between 1954 and 1961 the Ministry of Health and Welfare issued permits 
to manufacture a drug called "Isomin" which contained Thalidomide. After 
1960 a significant number of infants were born with birth defects; 63 fam- 
ilies sued the government and Dai Nippon Pharmaceutical Co. claiming 
that the deformities had been caused by use of this drug. See H. Teff and C. 
Munro, TBALWOMIDE: THE LEGAL AFTERMATH (1976)~ at  4, 7; K. Ta- 
dashi, TRALIDOMIDE IN JAPAN (1965)~ a t  501-02. 
243 Yabutani u. The Boeing Company, Tokyo District Court, 754 HANREI J HO 
58, (1975) I9 JAP. ANN. OF INT'L AW 225. 
244 This antimalarial drug caused widespread side-effects such as retinitis. Na- 
tional Government Reaches First Settlement on Chloroquine Case, JAPAN 
TRADE LAW BULLETIN, July 1982, at  13. 
245 Id., at  15. 
246 The Japanese goal of reducing the risk of injuries due to defective products 
through standardization and inspection of goods prior to their entry on the 
market has the effect of narrowing the options open to manufacturers and 
consumers in dealing with products liability risks. Accident reduction costs 
and costs of compliance, as well as insurance costs will, a t  least to some 
extent, be passed on to all consumers in the price of the product The 
individual is not free to trade off price and risk of injury, but rather is 
forced to pay for a minimum amount of safety and insurance. 
247 MITI, REVIEW OF STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS (25 March 
19831, at  7- 
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First, the traditional cultural attributes of the Japanese, especially 
their concern with hierarchy and ordering and the "communal and 
anti-individualistic attitudes" of some litigants2" can be contrasted 
with Western individualism and market allocative institutions.24g 
Certainly, there is a correlation between culture and attitudes to- 
wards risk.250 
Second, litigation is not a central political or social institution in 
Japan. On balance, it is impossible to say whether this is due to 
structural obstacles to litigationz5' or to culture, history and religion; 
indeed, it does not matter. Our point is simply that the social phe- 
nomenon called "products liability" will not be resolved in Japan 
through "ex post" tort compensation and "market deterrence"252 to 
the same degree that it is in Western societies. For some mixture of 
reasons the Japanese response has favoured regulatory control of 
this problem, and not litigati0n.2~~ 
In a recent paper Ronald Dore discussed the "obligational con- 
tracting" basis of Japanese market relationships? 54 Dore character- 
248 Upham, supra, note 48, at  613, 616. 
249 See R. Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law (1981) 8 BRIT. J. OF LAW 
& SOCIETY 199. 
For example, contract law reflects a movement away from tradition and 
hierarchical status relationships to relationships based on individual expres- 
sions of autonomy, free will and valuation of commodities. The ideology of 
self-determination, the exercise of free will, a passive state and the imma- 
teriality of community ideals of justice are simply too significant to ignore in 
the ideology of contract law in England and Canada. Traditional contract 
theory chose to isolate the transaction and its participants from all pre- 
existing social, cultural and even legal relations - the paradigmatic discrete 
transaction so vividly pictured by Victor Goldberg and Ian Macneil. See V. 
Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract (1976) 10 
J. OF ECON. ISSUES 45; I. Macneil, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1g80), 
at 1-18; P. Gabel and J. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology in THE POLITICS 
OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982), at 176-77. 
250 M. Douglas and A. Wildavsky, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE 
SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS ( I g82), at 
91-101. 
251 See Haley, supra, notes 46 and 55. 
25"- See Shavell, supra, note 240, and Calabresi, supra, note 89. 
253 T. Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN 
JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (A. von Mehren ed. 
1963). H. Tanaka, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM (1g76), at  254. 
2% R. Dore, Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism, based on the Hob- 
house Memorial Lecture, London School of Economics, May 1983 (unpub- 
lished transcript). See also J. Landa (Institute for Policy Analysis), THE 
ECONOMICS OF THE ETHNICALLY-HOMOGENEOUS MIDDLEMAN GROUP: A 
LOW-COST CLUB-LIKE ECONO~IIC ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOF~IIZING ON 
CONTRACT-ENFORCEMENT AND INFORMATION COSTS, Working Paper No. 
- - 
7924 (October I 979). 
Landa ar.mes that. in the absence of a lead framework. the behaviour of 
the actors i i  constrained by a social strucGre which decieases information 
costs associated with assessing the trustworthiness of the other participants. 
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izes the Japanese contract model as embodying long-term relation- 
ships, a dynamic definition of these relationships, and mutual trust, 
in contrast to the discrete contract model which underlies so much 
of traditional Canadian contract doctrine. He explains the distinc- 
tion between Western contracting models and the Japanese con- 
tracting model by reference to cultural sources, including the long- 
term future orientation of the Japanese, risk aversion, and a pref- 
erence for equality and risk-sharing. The Japanese sense of duty 
towards their (relational) contracting partner, and the associated 
reduction in conflict is explained as an aspect of their culture and 
history. This explanation of contract law is equally apt for Japanese 
products liability law in particular, and for the regulation of product 
safety in general. If these attitudes describe the Japanese character, 
and have influenced the legal response to product safety regulation, 
it is our view that Western trade policy which demands radical regu- 
latory reform is ill-advised because it is insensitive to the reality of 
Japan. 
VI. A POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION 
If it is true that we ought not to demand the crude Westernization 
of Japanese product safety regulation, what alternative courses of 
action are open to us? The problems associated with non-tariff stan- 
dards barriers are substantially different from those with which 
trade negotiators have had experience in the past. The following 
remarks offer some tentative proposals for the development of trade 
policy in the future. 
One of the major difficulties with reform of standards barriers 
arises from their specificity and diversity. Complaints have ranged 
from the cost of metric and language labelling requirements to the 
unacceptability of foreign inspection data and packaging design 
standards, to the stringency of inspection requirements. Foreign sug- 
gestions for improvement have demanded that the Japanese inter- 
nationalize their standards, abolish re-inspection of goods, exercise 
administrative discretion to except minor transgressions, and accept 
imperial and metric labelling. The initial stage of any Canadian 
initiative in the area of non-tariff standards barriers must be the 
acquisition of industry-specific or product-specific information relat- 
ing to product standard trade barriers faced by Canadian indus- 
try.255 Each particular commodity, and perhaps each product, faces 
255 In A REVIEW OF CANADIAN TRADE POLICY, published in 1983 by the Dept. 
of External Affairs, only tcvo paragraphs in the 237-page document were 
devoted to non-tariff standards bamers. 
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a unique standard barrier.256 The negotiation of such trade impedi- 
ments requires identification of affected Japanese interests, consulta- 
tion with the relevant governmental authority, articulation of the 
non-trade related social, economic or product safety objective sought 
to be achieved by the Japanese law, analysis of the validity of the 
objective, identification of alternative means to achieve the objec- 
tive, and then the articulation of appropriate proposals for reform 
taking into account the legal structure of Japanese society. 
Unlike tarifFs, the non-tariff standards banier involves issues, pub- 
lic and private enterprises, and constituencies which are not usually 
present when the opponents or proponents of tariff and quota reduc- 
tion proposals negotiate trade policy. At the very least, standards 
barrier reforms involve piecemeal liberalization measures and do not 
lend themselves to global solutions, nor even perhaps to quantifica- 
tion. A proposal which reflects these characteristics is the facilitation 
of private consultation between Canadian industry and their private 
Japanese counterparts in order to encourage the specific reforms 
necessary in the case of particular manufactured products exported 
to Japan.257 Assiting groups such as the Canada-Japan Business- 
men's Conferencezs8 with its emphasis on private bilateral consulta- 
tion and informal assistance in market penetration may be the most 
efficacious method to reduce non-tariff standard barriers. 
Thus one can argue that development of Canadian institutions 
which deal specifically with product standards and certification bar- 
riers must have two characteristics. First, they must involve bilateral 
256 See Foreign Firms are Irked Over Needless Procedures, supra, note 18, 
a t  I,  3. 
257 I t  should be recognized that many Japanese trade barriers have cultural or 
social aspects and are not directly subject to governmental control. The 
complex distribution system, parochial business practices, monopsonies and 
cultural and language barriers are examples: supra, note 255, a t  155-56. 
258 CANADA-JAPAN BUSINESSMEN'S CONFERENCE R PORT (1983). The Canada- 
Japan Business Cooperation Committee has, since 1976, involved represen- 
tatives from the private sectors in both countries in bilateral trade consulta- 
tion, communication and negotiations. I t  does not appear, however, that 
standards barriers have been a major concern of the committee. Id.  See also 
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, WINNING WORLD MARKETS 
( I 978) ; Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce, MARKETS FOR CANA- 
DIAN EXPORTERS: JAPAN (1979) ; F. Langdon, THE POLITICS OF CANADIAN- 
JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS I 952-1 983 ( I g83), a t  145. 
Bilateral negotiations of trade barriers relating to product standards may 
further a Canadian interest in acting independently of the United States. 
Langdon, id., a t  77. As well, governmental efforts to increase trade in 
manufactured goods have been historically unsuccessful. The primary actors 
must be private enterprises: id., a t  go. 
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negotiations with Japd5 '  which while acknowledging the multi- 
lateral aspect of standards barriers, will focus on the particular non- 
tariff product standards barriers which characterize Canada- Japan 
trade. At the same time the peculiar balance of governmental and 
private institutions which d e h e  the Japanese industrial complex, 
and the product-specific nature of most standards barriers demand 
that the negotiations involve both commercial and governmental 
representatives in co-operative ventures. This "product by productyy 
approach wiU, it seems, serve broader Canada-Japan trade interests 
as well?'" 
Moreover, business enterprises, whether engaged in these bilateral 
negotiations or acting independently, must be willing to engage in 
expensive and time-consuming marketing investments to overcome 
linguistic barriers, cultural biases, the complex Japanese distribu- 
tion system and other non-legal barriers. The unilateral authority 
of the Japanese government to modify these practices is limited, 
further supporting the necessity of private commercial activity.z61 To 
the extent that the Canadian government is involved, it must be will- 
ing to invest in a similar manner in order to deal effectively with 
the complex political and economic environment of Japan, espe- 
cially in view of the mixture of second and third order social and 
cultural considerations reflected in non-tariff standards 
Japanese trade barriers may be reduced, as well, through unilat- 
eral Canadian action. Recent developments in standard-setting 
which effectively delegate regulatory power to private standard- 
setting bodies consisting of manufacturing interests permit interna- 
tional trade effects to be considered in the development of Cana- 
dian standards.283 It is fair to say that Canadian manufacturers will 
take into account foreign marketing opportunities in a consensus 
model of standard-setting. The effect may be that Canadian stan- 
dards complement Japanese standards. 
A further recommendation is directed at the implementation stage 
of product standards, which includes the administrative review pro- 
cess and certification procedures. Canadian industry and government 
259 See A REVIEW OF CANADIAN TRADE POLICY, supra, note 257, at 203. 
260 Id., at 220-22. 
261 Japan Makes Serious Bid to Open Markets, FINANCIAL POST, Special Report 
on Japan, 28 May 1983, at s. 3, col. 4. 
262 Abbott and Totman, supra, note 12, at 147-50. 
263 C.S.A. President Advocates Consensus as Alternative to Government Rules, 
THE GLOBE AND MAR, 20 July 1982, at B I ,  col. I .  
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must make substantial investments in order to participate effectively 
in Japanese standard-setting, testing and certification bodies, as well 
as in Japanese trade associations. The recent experiences of Ameri- 
can industry suggest that Japan is beginning to permit foreign rep- 
resentation in limited sectors of its standard-setting institutions.264 
Private unilateral action may also take the form of the establish- 
ment of a Canada-Japan Trade Office (CJTO) in Canada. The 
Trade Promotion division of the Bureau of Pacific Affairs in the 
Department of External Affairs is currently responsible for the task 
of resolving standards barrier disputes. The Pacific Relations division 
in the Department is not involved with these issues, and the Joint- 
Economic Committee, consisting of government representatives from 
both countries focuses on issues of far broader scope than non-tariff 
standards barriers. The Trade Promotion Group currently deals with 
each non-tariff standards barrier case which is brought to its atten- 
tion on a reactive basis, and is unable to collect comprehensive data 
on the impact of non-tariff barriers on Canada-Japan trade. The 
Canada- Japan Trade Office would, of course, perform the impor- 
tant function of acting as a conduit and focus for business enter- 
prise in order to make known to government the existence of non- 
tariff trade barriers. The export orientation of the CJTO would 
co-ordinate trade policy with Japan and, more important, would 
act as a liaison between Canadian regulators, business enterprise 
and the Japanese government. The CJTO would communicate di- 
rectly with the Office of Fair Trading in Japan and with the Office 
of Trade Ombudsman established in Japan as a result of United 
States neg0tiations.2~~ The experience of the Office of Trade Om- 
budsman in Japan confirms the idiosyncratic, highly variable nature 
2% See supra, note 181. In addition, the Treasury Board Directive mandating 
socio-economic impact analysis for major federal regulations obliges federal 
regulators to take into account international trade aspects of proposed regu- 
latory measures. See Treasury Board Canada, Administrative Policy Manual, 
Chapter 490, Socioeconomic Impact Analysis, December 1979, 3.3.2.(g) ; 
and Appendix E, Evaluation Methodologies, at  2.4. See also REPORT OF 
THE JAPAN-UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS GROUP, sujra, note 14, at  
59-60, 69. 
Canadian manufacturers can, through private negotiations, reduce the 
impact of standards established by private industry in Japan. See Personal 
Computers Multi-Function Models Introduced in Succession, THE JAPAN 
ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 4 Oct. 1983, at  29. 
265 The Japan-United States Economic Relations Group, SUPPLEMENTAL RE- 
PORT OF THE JAPAN-UNITED STATES ECONO~IIC RELATIONS GROUP, pre- 
pared for the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of 
Japan, October I 981, at  I 7, 18. Trade Barriers Come in Creative Packages, 
INDUSTRY WEEK, 5 April 1982, NO. I, at  26. 
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of industry complaints in this context. The CJTO would, it seems, 
perform a function similar to that of the Trade Facilitation and 
Trade Study Groups in the United States in providing detailed sec- 
toral analysis of Japanese business practicesSs6 Experience in those 
contexts suggests that private and informal consultative institutions 
are likely to lead to more profitable negotiations. As well, the in- 
formal consultative process in which this office would engage would 
seem to be consistent with Japanese practices, while ensuring the 
involvement of the Canadian g0vernrnent.2~' At the very least, this 
institution would collect data on standards barriers and detail the 
peculiar problems which Canadian exporters face, whether they re- 
late to inspection procedures, enforcement decisions, standards or 
foreign certification requirements. 
The impetus for much of the reform that has taken place so far 
has been the influence of American and E.E.C. interests which has 
resulted in indirect benefits to Canadian trade The les- 
son is that these bilateral and unilateral measures described above 
must be augmented by co-operation with American and European 
interests in multilateral negotiations concerning specific standards 
and standards barriers.269 In specific cases co-operation with Ameri- 
can interests at international standard-setting organizations will be 
an effective strategy for penetrating the Japanese marketP0 At the 
very least we should recognize that Canada is not one of Japan's 
leading trade partners, and that our interests may be sacrificed if 
Japan responds bilaterally to the concerns of its major trading part- 
ner~.~" This suggests that Canada should continue its international 
activities in international standards organizations, and should con- 
266 See TASK FORCE REPORT ( 1 9 8 0 ) ~  at 14-15. TASK FORCE REPORT ( 1 9 7 9 ) ~  
at 5. See Abbott and Totman, supra, note 12, at I 12-14. 
267 United States-Japan Trade White Paper, supra, note 7. 
2" Japan Eases Test Rules on Products, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 27 Feb. 1984, 
at I B I ~ ,  col. I .  
269 EEC Renews Demands on Japan to take Import Promotion Steps, THE 
JAPAN ECONO~EIC JOURNAL, I I O c t  1983, at 3 ;  I I IC  Co-ordination Urged, 
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 7 O c t  1983, at B I ~ ,  col. 3. 
270 Hard Work Pays Off For Canadian Exporters of Refrigerators, CONSENSUS,  
October 1983, Vol. 10, No. 4, at 10;  Canadian Chain Saw Exporters Could 
Benefit from New Standard, id., at I I .  
271 M. Donnelly, Growing Disharmony in  Canadian- Japanese Trade ( I 98 I ) 36 
INT'L JOURNAL 879, at 883. F. Langdon, Problem of Canada-Japan EGO- 
nomic Diplomacy in the 1960's and rg~o's,  the Third Option, in CANADIAN 
PERSPECTIVES O N  E C O N O ~ X M  REZATIONS WITH JAPAN (K.  Hay ed. 1g80), 
at 73. 
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tinue to be sensitive to United States-Japan non-tariff barrier nego- 
tiations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Our description of Japanese products liability law and regulatory 
standards, the elucidation of the underlying rationales of Japanese 
product safety regulation, and our articulation of tentative proposals 
for Canadian trade negotiators, does not have the purpose of seeking 
to vindicate Japanese international trade measures. It does how- 
ever seek to demonstrate that the view that Japanese international 
trade policy is unnecessarily protectionist is perhaps a narrow- 
minded one. While the Westernization of Japanese culture in the 
twentieth century is undeniable, it is ethnocentrism taken to its worst 
extreme to ignore Japanese history and values and assume that 
regulatory measures which North American countries may consider 
desirable for themselves are similarly desirable for Japan. 
Several decades ago a book was written called The Taming of the 
Nations,272 the thesis of which is compellingly appropriate to trade 
relations with Japan today. According to its author, to be effective a 
nation's law must correspond to its ideological inner order, a phrase 
which refers to the normative values, beliefs and habits of a peo- 
~ l e . 2 ~ ~  Further, an effective international policy for relations with 
that nation must recognize and take into account its ideological 
inner order.274 This paper has explored that part of the Japanese 
ideological inner order which may be relevant to product safety 
regulation. Our conclusion is that international trade relations in 
product safety matters may require a substantially different strategy 
than that which is appropriate for Western nations. Successful trade 
relations with Japan in the long term cannot be achieved without a 
sensitivity to Japanese culture and values. 
F. S. C. Northrop, THE TAMING OF THE NATIONS: A STUDY OF THE CUL- 
TURAL BASES OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY ( I 97 I ) . 
273 Id., at 5. 
27' Id., at 6. 
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